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ABSTRACT 
 Terrorists use the internet to facilitate every aspect of their nefarious activity. This 
use creates a novel research question: To what degree can an open-source social media 
intelligence (SOCMINT) gathering and analysis capability assist U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) in accomplishing its homeland security mission? The critics 
of SOCMINT argue it is an unnecessary, problematic, and ill-advised effort based on 
efficacy, data management, and constitutional grounds. Therefore, the thesis explores the 
past efforts, necessity, and efficacy of open-source SOCMINT in identifying potential 
fraud, public safety, and/or national security concerns (threats) from immigrants seeking 
immigration benefits. The research consists of qualitatively examining issue rhetoric—the 
debate and discussion—between the critics and supporters of SOCMINT. The Profiles of 
Individual Radicalization in the U.S. dataset provides a quantitative, evidence-grounded 
means to gain insight on radicalized immigrants’ use of the internet and social media in 
plotting attacks and the potential for threat detection. The research demonstrates threats 
among immigration benefit seekers exist, and that SOCMINT is a viable means to identify 
and mitigate the threats. The thesis concludes the propositions for SOCMINT are valid and 
the critics’ objections should not impede the effort. The thesis recommends USCIS 
continue SOCMINT, ensuring the endeavor observes a balance between security and 
liberty. 
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Terrorists use the internet to disseminate propaganda, solicit new members, 
communicate, gather intelligence, seek money, and inspire and plan attacks.1 In 2015, the 
San Bernardino, California, terrorist attack brought the use of social media intelligence 
(SOCMINT) by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) to vet immigration benefit seekers under scrutiny. 
Republicans and Democrats in both the House and Senate indicated support for using 
SOCMINT to screen individuals entering the United States.2 In 2016, DHS expanded its 
use of SOCMINT under Secretary Johnson’s command.  
USCIS “administers the nation’s lawful immigration system, safeguarding its 
integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration 
benefits while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring our values.”3 
USCIS began conducting SOCMINT research and development projects to test the 
automation of “bulk screening of social media information” supplemented with human 
analyst review “across a number of high-priority populations.”4 The Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) investigated and reported on DHS’ preliminary efforts as if they 
were pilots rather than research and development projects.5 Based, in part, on the OIG 
                                               
1 Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018), 6, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.  
2 Stuart N. Brotman, “Social Media Screening for Terrorism Needs Multiple Lenses,” TechTank 
(blog), The Brookings Institution, December 22, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/12/
22/social-media-screening-for-terrorism-needs-multiple-lenses/.  
3 “About Us,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, March 6, 2018, https://www.uscis.gov/
aboutus.  
4 “Written Testimony of I&A Under Secretary Francis Taylor, USCIS Director Leon Rodriguez, TSA 
Deputy Administrator Huban Gowadia, ICE Deputy Director Daniel Ragsdale, and CBP Deputy 
Commissioner Kevin McAleenan for a House Committee on Homeland Security hearing titled ‘Shutting 
Down Terrorist Pathways into America,’” Department of Homeland Security, September 14, 2016, 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/09/14/written-testimony-ia-uscis-tsa-ice-and-cbp-house-committee-
homeland-security-hearing.  
5 John Roth, DHS’ Pilots for Social Media Screening Need Increased Rigor to Ensure Scalability and 
Long-term Success (Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General Department of Homeland Security, 
2017), 4, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-40-Feb17.pdf.  
xiv 
findings and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) releases, the skeptics of SOCMINT 
argue against its use. These critics contend that the number of social media platforms, 
posts, and foreign languages used, context ambiguities, constitutional implications, data 
management issues, and targets’ evasion efforts make the DHS open-source SOCMINT 
capability unviable.6  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Terrorists’ use of the internet, DHS’ response, and the critics’ claims create a 
novel research question. To what degree can an open-source SOCMINT gathering and 
analysis capability assist USCIS in accomplishing its homeland security mission? 
Determining if open-source SOCMINT is viable for DHS and identifying how to 
maintain a successful open-source SOCMINT capability requires answers to various 
questions. For example, how can DHS analyze the large volume of social media content 
                                               
6 For number of platforms and posts issues, see William Marcellino et al., Monitoring Social Media: 
Lessons for Future Department of Defense Social Media Analysis in Support of Information Operations 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 10–11, https://www.rand.org/t/RR1742; Faiza Patel et al., “Social 
Media Monitoring: How the Department of Homeland Security Uses Digital Data in the Name of National 
Security,” Brennan Center for Justice, May 22, 2019, 5, https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/social-
media-monitoring. For language issues, see Denzil Correa and Ashish Sureka, “Solutions to Detect and 
Analyze Online Radicalization: A Survey,” IITD PhD Comprehensive Report 5, no. N (January 2013), 15, 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1301.4916v1.pdf; Patel et al., “Social Media Monitoring,” 4–5. For context issues, see 
“Social Media Monitoring: Government Surveillance of Public Space” (working paper, Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, 2018), 14–15, https://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0518/Social-Media-
Monitoring.pdf; Patel et al., “Social Media Monitoring,” 4. For legal and privacy issues, see Faiz Shakir 
and Manar Waheed, “ACLU Comment on State Department Notices Requiring Social Media Information 
from Visa Applicants,” ACLU, October 2, 2017, 1, https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-comment-
supplemental-questions-visa-applicants; Patel et al., “Social Media Monitoring,” 3, 9; Hugh Handeyside, 
“The Many Problems with the Trump Administration’s Plan to Hold on to Some Immigrants’ Social Media 
Posts,” (blog), ACLU, September 29, 2017, https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-
surveillance/many-problems-trump-administrations-plan-hold-some; Rachel Levinson-Waldman, 
“Government Access to and Manipulation of Social Media: Legal and Policy Challenges,” Howard Law 
Journal 61, no. 3 (2018): 531, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/cc2615_23ccb9a7aa1a4098b4742b
01e5e443e6.pdf#page=43; Electronic Privacy Information Center, “Social Media Monitoring: Government 
Surveillance of Public Space,” 2; Brian Mund, “Social Media Searches and the Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy,” Yale Journal of Law and Technology 19, no. 1 (2017): 241, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/
yjolt/vol19/iss1/5; Hugh Handeyside and Matt Cagle, “Freedom of Information Act Request for Records on 
Federal Agencies’ Monitoring of Social Media,” ACLU, May 24, 2018, 3, https://www.aclu.org/legal-
document/foia-request-social-media-surveillance. For data management issues, see Patel et al., “Social 
Media Monitoring,” 8–9; David Inserra, “The U.S. Should Tread Carefully on Social Media Vetting,” The 
Heritage Foundation, April 12, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/terrorism/report/the-us-should-tread-carefully-
social-media-vetting. For targets’ evasion efforts, see Shakir and Waheed, “ACLU Comment on State 
Department Notices,” 9; Patel et al., “Social Media Monitoring,” 4; Nikita Malik, Terror in the Dark: How 
Terrorists Use Encryption, the Darknet, and Cryptocurrencies (London: The Henry Jackson Society, 
2018), iv, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf.  
xv 
on hundreds of social media platforms efficiently? How can DHS maintain an open-
source SOCMINT capability consistent with constitutional requirements? How can DHS 
differentiate the context of social media content, e.g., legitimate threat versus satire? How 
can DHS efficiently navigate an endeavor involving numerous languages? Do targets’ 
evasion efforts make the DHS open-source SOCMINT efforts futile? This thesis answers 
these related questions during the effort to answer the research question.  
B. PURPOSE 
This thesis seeks to fill a gap in the literature—the lack of immigration-related 
SOCMINT scholarship—by exploring the necessity and efficacy of open-source 
SOCMINT in identifying potential fraud, public safety, and/or national security concerns 
(threats) from immigrants seeking immigration benefits from USCIS. In terms of 
practical implications, the thesis provides policymakers an inventory of the critics’ 
objections to SOCMINT. It offers insights into DHS’ policy and procedural safeguards to 
avoid the perils related to the critics’ objections. It evaluates and rebuts the critics’ 
claims, where possible, by providing a more fulsome review of the applicable documents 
about the DHS SOCMINT efforts than exists in the public discourse.  
C. RESEARCH METHODS 
This thesis examines the qualitative data of the issue rhetoric—the debate and 
discussion—between the critics and supporters of implementing SOCMINT. This 
rhetoric exists in the open-source literature, e.g., books, scholarly journals, articles, news 
stories, FOIA-released documents, and government reports and memorandums. In 
addition, quantitative data from the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United 
States (PIRUS) dataset provides insight into the viability of using SOCMINT to identify 
threats among immigration benefit seekers.  
D. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The research results show that the critics’ objections are mostly unpersuasive. 
Open-source SOCMINT is a viable means for USCIS to identify and mitigate threats 
among immigration benefit seekers for the following reasons: 
xvi 
• The PIRUS dataset confirms that the propositions for SOCMINT are 
valid.7  
• A broader analysis of the OIG report and FOIA-released documents 
undermines the allegation that efforts to deploy a SOCMINT capability to 
date have been fraught with problems.  
• Insights from the 9/11 Commission, other experts, a rational, objective 
reading of the OIG and FOIA reports, and the PIRUS dataset undermine 
the argument that the nation is safe enough without SOCMINT.  
• A broader analysis of the OIG report and FOIA-released documents 
refutes the claims about yield in identifying threats. The critics’ 
automation arguments about scope and scale are unpersuasive because 
USCIS is not relying on automated SOCMINT for the process of 
reviewing posts. Safeguards are in place to mitigate language and context 
misinterpretation and any potential derivative adverse outcomes. The 
PIRUS dataset contradicts the critics’ encryption claim for both internet 
users and social media users. The critics’ claim about identity resolution is 
questionable.  
• The critics’ arguments about misinterpretation from data sharing are 
unpersuasive because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
open-source social media data.  
                                               
7 “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), accessed June 8, 2019, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/data-tools/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-pirus. “The bulk of 
data collection for PIRUS was supported by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Department of Justice, through Award Number 2012-ZA-BX-0005. In addition, an effort to review and 
update information in the PIRUS dataset has been supported with funding from the Department of 
Homeland Security through the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Behavior (CSTAB) Partner grant. 
The PIRUS dataset and any findings derived from the dataset do not represent the official positions of the 
National Institute of Justice, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, or any other 
funding agency.” “PIRUS—Frequently Asked Questions,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism, accessed August 12, 2019, https://www.start.umd.edu/pirus-frequently-asked-
questions.  
xvii 
• The nature of the social media data collected, privacy rules, and the 
information collected from non-social media data collection efforts 
undermine the argument about SOCMINT privacy intrusiveness.  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis offers SOCMINT policymakers a number of recommendations: 
• USCIS should continue to use open-source SOCMINT to identify fraud, 
public safety, and/or national security threats. Agile leveraging of 
authorities and technology to meet threat identification needs is critical. It 
is important to look broadly beyond DHS for expertise and best practices 
on SOCMINT among law enforcement agency partners’ initiatives, e.g., 
Social Media the Internet and Law Enforcement conferences, Five Eyes 
members, and Real-time Open Source Analysis of Social Media.8  
• DHS should use care in appropriately designating efforts as pilots or 
research and development projects and ensure a unified understanding, 
management, and messaging across DHS components. DHS components 
should resist merely concurring with OIG findings to silence concerns 
versus defending actions on their merits. Senior DHS leadership should 
publicly defend ill-informed narratives from critic and media echo 
chambers that confound fact-based public interpretation of DHS 
initiatives.  
• DHS should consider supplementing the open solicitation and commercial 
tool approach for SOCMINT tool development in favor of a model more 
aligned with the United Kingdom’s Detecting and ANalysing TErrorist-
related online contents and financing activities and reTriEval and aNalysis 
                                               
8 Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and 
Department of Justice, Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information (Washington, DC: 
Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of 
Justice, 2017), 8, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Domestic_Sharing_
Counterterrorism_Information_Report.pdf.  
xviii 
of heterogeneouS online content for terrOrist activity Recognition project 
approaches.9  
• DHS should research the viability of creating a centralized Center of 
Excellence for DHS’ SOCMINT capability modeled on the United 
Kingdom’s Centre of Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence & 
Organised Crime Research Open-source Intelligence Hub.10  
• USCIS should ensure data and constitutional protections are robust. 
Policies, procedures, and training are in place to prevent problems. 
However, as with any human-based system, efforts at the front end may 
not guarantee employee conduct during execution. Policies, procedures, 
and training are not 100 percent effective, despite best intentions. 
Consequently, USCIS must also remain equally vigilant in its oversight 
efforts to protect the principles of the U.S. homeland.  
  
                                               
9 For DANTE, see “Aims & Goals,” DANTE Project, accessed May 1, 2019, https://www.h2020-
dante.eu/aims-goals/. For TENSOR, see “Aims & Objectives,” TENSOR Project, accessed May 1, 2019, 
https://tensor-project.eu/overview/aims-and-objectives/.  
10 Babak Akhgar, “OSINT as an Integral Part of the National Security Apparatus,” in Open Source 
Intelligence Investigation: From Strategy to Implementation, eds. Babak Akhgar, P. Saskia Bayerl, and 
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In this respect, the Internet has proved to be an especially beneficial 
communications medium for terrorists—a key means for both external 
propaganda and internal command and control and information purposes.  




Ninety percent of intelligence comes from open sources. The other ten 
percent, the clandestine work, is just the more dramatic. The real 
intelligence hero is Sherlock Holmes, not James Bond.  
—General Sam Wilson, USA Retired, former Director, 
Defense Intelligence Agency 
 
 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
To what degree can an open-source social media intelligence (SOCMINT) 
gathering and analysis capability assist U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) in accomplishing its homeland security mission?  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Terrorists use the internet to disseminate propaganda, solicit new members, 
communicate, gather intelligence, seek money, and inspire and plan attacks.1 Suspects 
openly boasting on social media venues of their nefarious intentions prior to acting upon 
them has proven to be an invaluable roadmap of radicalization and detection—an upside 
                                               
1 Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2018), 6, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.  
2 
for law enforcement and intelligence entities.2 State, local, international, and numerous 
federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are using social media to identify potential 
terrorists.3  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is leveraging the analytic 
generation of intelligence from open-source social media sources—SOCMINT—to 
identify and deter terrorists.4 The DHS’ implementation of an open-source SOCMINT 
capability seeks to leverage the efficient and effective use of open-source information and 
analysis to help secure the homeland.5 However, the skeptics argue that the number of 
social media platforms, posts, and foreign languages used, context ambiguities, 
constitutional implications, data management issues, and targets’ evasion efforts create a 
                                               
2 “TSG IntelBrief: Recalibrating the Terror Threat Radar,” The Soufan Group, December 7, 2015, 
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December 12, 2015, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-fbi-law-enforcement-counterterrorism-
protection-2015dec12-story.html#; “Police Minister: Social Media Monitoring Has Foiled 200 Terror 
Attacks,” Times of Israel, June 12, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/police-minister-social-media-
monitoring-has-foiled-200-terror-attacks/.  
3 For local law enforcement use, see KiDeuk Kim, Ashlin Oglesby-Neal, and Edward Mohr, 2016 Law 
Enforcement Use of Social Media Survey (Washington, DC: International Association of the Chiefs of 
Police and the Urban Institute, 2017), 3, https://www.urban.org/research/publication/2016-law-
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Detection,” POLITICO, November 24, 2015, https://www.politico.eu/article/paris-how-jihadists-go-dark-
to-avoid-detection-encryption-terrorists/. For Department of Defense use, see Ian Duncan, “Social Media Is 
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2016, http://www.baltimoresun.com/bs-md-military-social-media-20160206-story.html. For Central 
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Your Latest Facebook Rant Is Raw Intel,” (blog), ACLU, September 29, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/blog/
privacy-technology/internet-privacy/government-your-latest-facebook-rant-raw-intel. For Department of 
State use, see Dan Cadman, “‘Extreme Vetting’ and Social Media Inquiries,” Center for Immigration 
Studies, April 3, 2018, https://cis.org/Cadman/Extreme-Vetting-and-Social-Media-Inquiries. For 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement use, see Sam Biddle and Spencer Woodman, “These Are the 
Technology Firms Lining Up to Build Trump’s ‘Extreme Vetting’ Program,” The Intercept, August 7, 
2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/08/07/these-are-the-technology-firms-lining-up-to-build-trumps-
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4 David Omand, Jamie Bartlett, and Carl Miller, “Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT),” 
Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 6 (2012): 802, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.716965.  
5 United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Summary of Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Washington, DC: United States Senate Committee on Governmental 
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complex terrain of challenges that make the DHS open-source SOCMINT capability 
unviable.6  
Identifying the challenges in this terrain, assessing the skeptics’ concerns, and 
offering DHS’ policy makers a set of recommendations provides a path forward as DHS’ 
SOCMINT efforts expand. Determining if open-source SOCMINT is viable for DHS and 
identifying how to maintain a successful open-source SOCMINT capability requires 
answers to various questions. For example, how can DHS analyze the large volume of 
social media content on hundreds of social media platforms efficiently? How can DHS 
maintain an open-source SOCMINT capability consistent with constitutional 
requirements? How can DHS differentiate the context of social media content, e.g., 
legitimate threat versus satire? How can DHS efficiently navigate an endeavor involving 
numerous languages? Do targets’ evasion efforts make the DHS open-source SOCMINT 
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Security,” Brennan Center for Justice, May 22, 2019, 5, https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/social-
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from Visa Applicants,” ACLU, October 2, 2017, 1, https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-comment-
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surveillance/many-problems-trump-administrations-plan-hold-some; Rachel Levinson-Waldman, 
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01e5e443e6.pdf#page=43; Electronic Privacy Information Center, “Social Media Monitoring: Government 
Surveillance of Public Space,” 2; Brian Mund, “Social Media Searches and the Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy,” Yale Journal of Law and Technology 19, no. 1 (2017): 241, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/
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efforts futile? This thesis answers these related questions during the effort to answer the 
research question.  
C. BACKGROUND 
Criminals have exploited data networks for as long as the networks have existed.7 
The most powerful network—the internet—attracting billions of users inevitably became 
the wrongdoers’ focus.8 Al-Qaeda established its first website in the 1990s.9 In a 2012 
survey, approximately 80 percent of federal, state, and local law enforcement 
investigators acknowledged using social media for intelligence collection.10 One editor 
explained, “We’re not talking about collecting metadata or compelling companies to turn 
over information, but good, old-fashioned subterfuge and digital legwork.”11  
In 2015, the San Bernardino, California, terrorist attack brought the SOCMINT 
discussion relating to DHS’ and USCIS’ vetting efforts into the media spotlight. When 
the radicalized Muslim couple killed 14 people and injured nearly two dozen others at an 
office party, the wife, Tashfeen Malik, a Pakistani national, became the focus of 
attention.12 In 2014, she used a K-1 visa, the type for people who intend to marry a U.S. 
citizen, to gain admission into the United States.13 Malik passed two background checks 
prior to being admitted and a third check in the summer of 2015, when USCIS, a DHS 
                                               
7 “Terror and the Internet: Tech Firms Could Do More to Help Stop the Jihadists,” Economist, June 
10, 2017, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/06/10/tech-firms-could-do-more-to-help-stop-the-
jihadists.  
8 Economist.  
9 Monika Bickert and Brian Fishman, “Hard Questions: How Effective Is Technology in Keeping 
Terrorists Off Facebook?,” Facebook Newsroom, April 23, 2018, https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/
keeping-terrorists-off-facebook/.  
10 “Role of Social Media in Law Enforcement Significant and Growing,” LexisNexis, July 18, 2012, 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/about-us/media/press-release.page?id=1342623085481181.  
11 Elizabeth Nolan Brown, “Facebook Check Wouldn’t Have Stopped San Bernardino Terrorists, No 
Matter What GOP Candidates Say,” Reason, December 16, 2015, https://reason.com/2015/12/16/social-
media-dhs-and-isis/.  
12 Stuart N. Brotman, “Social Media Screening for Terrorism Needs Multiple Lenses,” TechTank 
(blog), The Brookings Institution, December 22, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/12/
22/social-media-screening-for-terrorism-needs-multiple-lenses/.  
13 Brotman.  
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component, granted her lawful permanent residency (a green card).14 During the early 
stages of the post-attack investigation, investigators initially concluded that Malik, prior 
to her K-1 visa approval, had discussed violent jihad on her social media.15 As a result, 
officials in Washington, District of Columbia, made improving the visa application 
screening process urgent.16 The State Department and DHS announced they were 
contemplating stricter scrutiny of visa applicants’ social media use.17 Democrats and 
Republicans launched initiatives in the Senate and House that would require heightened 
social media screening in the visa adjudication process.18  
Several congressional Republicans, including former Senator John McCain and 
former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte, prepared legislation that 
would require DHS to conduct SOCMINT on all foreigners submitting applications for 
entry to the United States.19 McCain said, “It is unacceptable that Congress has to 
legislate on this, and that it wasn’t already the Department of Homeland Security’s 
practice to take such commonsense steps when screening individuals entering this 
country.”20 Democrats joined in the growing congressional scrutiny.21 Senator Chuck 
Schumer, the third-ranking Senate Democrat, and Senator Jeanne Shaheen led a group of 
22 Senate Democrats who sent Jeh Johnson, then Secretary of DHS, a request to establish 
a policy promptly that mandated conducting SOCMINT on all foreigners seeking visas to 
enter the United States.22 Secretary Johnson’s remarks in a POLITICO interview mark 
the first time that he publicly discussed the merits of vetting social media for immigration 
                                               
14 Brotman.  
15 Brotman. The social media conversations were private direct messages and would not have been 
uncovered through open-source SOCMINT efforts.  
16 Brotman.  
17 Brotman.  
18 Brotman.  
19 Seung Min Kim, “DHS Chief: ‘Legal Limits’ on Scrutinizing Immigrants’ Web Postings,” 
POLITICO, December 15, 2015, https://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/jeh-johnson-immigrants-web-
posting-216795.  
20 Kim.  
21 Kim.  
22 Kim.  
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cases.23 He indicated that DHS had initiated an experimental program months earlier to 
examine social media accounts of those seeking immigration benefits.24 Former President 
Barack Obama instructed both the State Department and DHS to evaluate the K-1 visa 
screening process for “possible program enhancements.”25  
In 2016, DHS expanded its use of social media to include more than 30 different 
investigative and operational uses.26 The DHS Social Media Task Force (SMTF) 
recommended expanding the department’s use of social media in the vetting and 
screening mission initiatives.27 Secretary Johnson concluded, in accordance with 
applicable privacy and other laws, that this expansion was imperative.28 DHS officials 
testified that DHS limits the use of social media to publicly available information, in 
accordance with the DHS authorities, and handles and maintains the information 
consistent with the relevant System of Records Notices and the Privacy Act.29 
Collaborating with the Science and Technology (S&T) directorate, DHS tested the 
automation of “bulk screening of social media information” supplemented with human 
analyst “review across a number of high-priority populations,” including Electronic 
System for Travel Authorization and refugee applicants.30 S&T continued to “work with 
industry to leverage the billions of dollars of private sector investment in social media 
analytics to identify solutions that can best support DHS screening and vetting.”31  
                                               
23 Kim.  
24 Kim.  
25 Kim.  
26 “Written Testimony of I&A Under Secretary Francis Taylor, USCIS Director Leon Rodriguez, TSA 
Deputy Administrator Huban Gowadia, ICE Deputy Director Daniel Ragsdale, and CBP Deputy 
Commissioner Kevin McAleenan for a House Committee on Homeland Security hearing titled ‘Shutting 
Down Terrorist Pathways into America,’” Department of Homeland Security, September 14, 2016, 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/09/14/written-testimony-ia-uscis-tsa-ice-and-cbp-house-committee-
homeland-security-hearing.  
27 Department of Homeland Security.  
28 Department of Homeland Security.  
29 Department of Homeland Security.  
30 Department of Homeland Security.  
31 Department of Homeland Security.  
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USCIS “administers the nation’s lawful immigration system, safeguarding its 
integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration 
benefits while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring our values.”32 
USCIS adjudicates more than 26,000 applications and petitions for a variety of 
immigration benefits on an average day.33 The benefits sought include applications for 
lawful permanent resident status (green cards), U.S. citizenship through naturalization, 
employment authorization, travel documents, etc. In each of these immigration benefit 
request-processing scenarios, USCIS vets applicants and petitioners by conducting 
security checks to identify any potential derogatory information that may indicate threats. 
According to the DHS Operational Use of Social Media, “USCIS uses social media, as 
defined in the Privacy Policy, to gather information for the purpose of benefits 
determinations and in support of administrative investigations into alleged violations of 
the immigration laws.”34 USCIS’ Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) 
directorate achieves the USCIS mission, in part, by discovering national security and 
public safety threats and identifying, investigating, and preventing immigration benefit 
fraud.35  
Congress, under a legal mechanism known as the Terrorism-related 
Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG), has established that terrorists should be prohibited from 
entering the United States.36 For example:  
                                               
32 “About Us,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, March 6, 2018, https://www.uscis.gov/
aboutus.  
33 “A Day in the Life of USCIS,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, April 20, 2018, 
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/a-day-life-uscis.  
34 Department of Homeland Security Office of Privacy, “DHS Operational Use of Social Media,” in 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Presidential Transition Records (Washington, DC: U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, 2016), 1428, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
USCIS%20Presidential%20Transition%20Records.pdf.  
35 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Office of Privacy, Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, DHS/USCIS/PIA-013-01 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services Office of Privacy, 2014), 1, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/privacy-pia-uscis-fdns-november2016_0.pdf.  
36 “Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG),” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
July 18, 2017, https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/terrorism-related-inadmissability-grounds/terrorism-
related-inadmissibility-grounds-trig.  
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generally, any individual who is a member of a “terrorist organization” or 
who has engaged or engages in terrorism-related activity as defined by the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is “inadmissible” (not allowed to 
enter) the United States and is not eligible for most immigration 
benefits.37  
USCIS defines egregious public safety (EPS) cases as those in which “information 
indicates the alien is under investigation for, has been arrested for (without disposition), 
or has been convicted of,” more serious offenses, e.g., “murder, rape, sexual abuse of a 
minor, illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices,” etc.38 USCIS defines a non-
EPS criminal case “as a case where information indicates the alien is under investigation 
for, has been arrested for (without disposition), or has been convicted of any crime not 
listed” in the EPS offenses.39 Both types of public safety concerns, EPS and non-EPS, 
can affect inadmissibility. The result of committing immigration benefit fraud is 
succinctly defined in the INA, “Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a 
material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other 
documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this 
chapter is inadmissible.”40 If the applicant’s social media reveals a potential fraud, public 
safety, and/or national security concern, then SOCMINT opens a line of inquiry that DHS 
can investigate in its mission to secure the homeland.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review assesses the state of knowledge about the viability of using 
open-source social media to identify potential threats to national security. The authors 
generally fall into three camps: the “technology experts” who explain the means, the 
“security experts” who condone using social media for vetting on safety grounds, and the 
                                               
37 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.  
38 For a complete list of egregious public safety offenses, see Lee Cissna, Updated Guidance for the 
Referral of Cases and Issuance of Notices to Appear (NTAs) in Cases Involving Inadmissible and 
Deportable Aliens (Washington, DC: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2018), 6, 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-28-PM-602-0050.1-
Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf.  
39 Cissna, 7.  
40 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Public Law 82-414, U.S. Statutes at Large 66 (1952): 
163–282, codified at U.S. Code 8 (1952) § 212(a)(6)(C).  
9 
“critics” who oppose using social media for vetting based on necessity, efficacy, or 
constitutional grounds.  
1. Technology Experts 
A thorough explanation of the detailed, complex technology behind a successful 
SOCMINT capability is beyond the scope of this literature review; however, a brief, 
high-level overview will greatly assist the reader in understanding SOCMINT. Optimally 
gathering large amounts of social media data requires a programmatic versus manual 
harvesting approach.41 Application programming interfaces provide a connection to the 
social media platform data source.42 After accessing the data, the analyst can mine the 
data for content of potential interest.43  
Analysts use machine learning, text analytics, deep neural networks, and various 
techniques to sift through the data programmatically.44 These techniques can improve the 
analysts’ timely collection of data about potential terrorist threats.45 The data may yield 
intelligence on terrorists’ activities, identities, and locations.46 For example, content-
based analysis focuses on what was said.47 Subject-based analysis focuses on what a 
particular person or group is saying.48 The analysts can use social media data to create 
maps based on interactions and relationships among users that may reveal previously 
unknown connections.49 However, accessing and analyzing social media data presents 
unique technology challenges.  
                                               
41 Janie Bartlett and Carl Miller, The State of The Art: A Literature Review of Social Media 
Intelligence Capabilities for Counter-Terrorism (London: Demos, 2013), 16, http://www.academia.edu/
5278957/The_State_of_the_Art_A_Literature_Review_of_Social_Media_Intelligence_Capabilities_for_
Counter-Terrorism.  
42 Bartlett and Miller, 16.  
43 Correa and Sureka, “Solutions to Detect and Analyze Online Radicalization,” 9.  
44 Marcellino et al., Monitoring Social Media, 11.  
45 Marcellino et al., 11.  
46 Marcellino et al., 11.  
47 Correa and Sureka, “Solutions to Detect and Analyze Online Radicalization,” 14.  
48 Correa and Sureka, 14.  
49 Marcellino et al., Monitoring Social Media, 11.  
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The first challenge is identifying content that may have a nexus to terrorism. 
Much of the literature focuses on addressing the scope, scale, language, and context 
challenges. Over 100 English-language social networks are in existence.50 Twitter users 
post 500 million tweets every day.51 Users on Facebook share almost five billion pieces 
of content every day.52 YouTube users upload over 18,000 hours of video every hour.53 
The enormous quantity of user content posted to these websites creates a challenge, but is 
a potentially fertile source to identify terrorism content.54 Omand et al. argue that it 
would not be difficult or cost prohibitive to increase the throughput of current social 
media data collection technologies.55 Social media platforms are inherently 
transnational.56 Social media content from Facebook includes more than 80 languages 
from across the world.57 Correa and Sureka posit that language creates challenges for 
content-based analysis methods because not all languages are written from left to right 
and some social media posts contain more than one language.58 Successfully extracting 
meaning from social media posts requires more than machine translation.59 For example, 
a potential for misinterpretation occurs when context is not considered.60 Duarte et al. 
recognize this limitation and argue that automated content analysis tool approaches must 
                                               
50 Gagan Mehra, “105 Leading Social Networks Worldwide,” PracticalEcommerce, September 27, 
2017, https://www.practicalecommerce.com/105-leading-social-networks-worldwide.  
51 Salman Aslam, “Twitter by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics & Fun Facts,” Omnicore, January 1, 
2018, https://www.omnicoreagency.com/twitter-statistics/.  
52 Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, “Scanning Social Media Could Stop the Next Terror Attack,” Vocativ, 
December 14, 2015, https://www.vocativ.com/260887/scanning-social-media-could-stop-the-next-terror-
attack/index.html.  
53 Larry Greenemeier, “Social Media’s Stepped-Up Crackdown on Terrorists Still Falls Short,” 
Scientific American, July 24, 2018, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/social-medias-stepped-up-
crackdown-on-terrorists-still-falls-short/.  
54 Marcellino et al., Monitoring Social Media, 10–11.  
55 Omand, Bartlett, and Miller, “Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT),” 817.  
56 David Patrikarakos, “Social Media Networks Are the Handmaiden to Dangerous Propaganda,” 
Time, November 2, 2017, http://time.com/5008076/nyc-terror-attack-isis-facebook-russia/.  
57 Monika Bickert and Brian Fishman, “Hard Questions: How We Counter Terrorism,” Facebook 
Newsroom, June 15, 2017, https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/.  
58 Correa and Sureka, “Solutions to Detect and Analyze Online Radicalization,” 12.  
59 Omand, Bartlett, and Miller, “Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT),” 810.  
60 Omand, Bartlett, and Miller, 812.  
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be supplemented with human validation.61 Despite the challenges, the technology experts 
agree that content with a nexus to terrorism can be identified.  
The second challenge is identifying the author of the content who may have a 
nexus to terrorism. The literature addresses how identity resolution, platform content 
removal, and evasion tactics complicate this identification endeavor. Yeung and his co-
authors see identity resolution—the task of matching an individual’s offline and online 
identities—as DHS’ biggest obstacle in SOCMINT.62 Identity resolution is challenging 
when users seek anonymity. Social media companies often remove terrorism-related 
content. However, deleting terrorism-related content can frustrate law enforcement 
efforts.63 Consequently, some agencies have requested that social media platforms 
refrain from removing terrorism-related content so that investigators can monitor 
terrorists and use undercover tactics to dupe terrorists into revealing information.64 
Goodman, embracing a less cooperative approach, argues that social media platforms 
should be held liable for material support of terrorism.65 Malik raises the point that 
terrorists can move to the Darknet, which is “more difficult to police than the surface and 
deep webs, meaning they have the potential to function as a jihadist virtual safe-
haven.”66 In general, the technology experts concur that identity resolution is difficult 
and that going dark exacerbates the identity problem.  
Each of these technology challenges—scope, scale, language, context, identity 
resolution, and evasion tactics—have to be overcome to create a viable SOCMINT 
                                               
61 Natasha Duarte, Emma Llanso, and Anna Loup, “Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated 
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Times, December 7, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/technology/terrorists-mock-bids-to-end-
use-of-social-media.html?_r=0.  
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capability. Identifying technology challenges, though, is only half of the journey. 
Sensible solutions also have to be identified. The literature, other than the Yeung et al. 
contribution, offers little insight that is directly on point with how DHS can overcome 
these challenges.  
2. Security Experts 
The literature from the security experts is diverse, but can be examined with four 
lenses: terrorists’ use of the internet, characterizations of that use, the implications on 
policing, and the experts’ value judgments regarding SOCMINT. EUROPOL, Coats, 
Akhgar, Staniforth, and Ines von Behr et al. agree that terrorists use the internet for 
disseminating propaganda, recruiting, plotting, funding, communicating, radicalizing, 
etc.67 The experience of the technology experts at the social media platforms validates 
this assessment. In the first quarter of 2018, Facebook identified almost two million 
pieces of al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) material, nearly double the 
amount in the previous quarter.68 In the last two quarters of 2017, Twitter banned almost 
275,000 accounts for promoting terrorism.69 Terrorists have no qualms about using open-
source platforms. An al-Qaeda training manual discovered in Afghanistan advised that 80 
percent of the information needed for attacking an enemy could be found in open 
                                               
67 EUROPOL, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (The Hague, the 
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Akhgar, P. Saskia Bayerl, and Fraser Sampson (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG, 2016), 
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sources.70 Terrorists synthesize this research into instructions. The 600-page 
Encyclopedia of Jihad is widely circulated online and includes chapters, such as “how to 
kill,” “explosive devices,” “manufacturing detonators,” and “assassination with mines.”71 
The security experts concur unanimously that terrorists use the internet.  
Despite consensus about terrorists’ use of the internet, the experts’ 
characterizations about that use vary. Nissen argues that terrorists have weaponized social 
media and that this phenomenon is not receiving the level of academic study necessary to 
supplement the existing body of research within traditional war-studies.72 The Australian 
government describes the internet as “the command and control networks of choice for 
terrorists.”73 Some counterterrorism experts label the internet as a “terrorist university, a 
place where terrorists can learn new techniques and skills to make them more effective in 
their attack methodologies.”74 Governor Kean, former chairman of the 9/11 Commission, 
reports in a recent Bipartisan Policy Center piece from the Task Force on Terrorism and 
Ideology that “many experts predict that the decline of the Islamic State’s territorial 
caliphate will lead it to redouble its efforts in the digital realm, seeking to remotely 
inspire and direct violence in the West.”75 Despite the nuances in articulation, each 
characterization agrees that the internet should be a priority for national security 
practitioners.  
Security experts recognize that this prioritization has profound implications on 
policing efforts. Spence and Gardham frame the issue as a paradigm shift—historically, 
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71 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, 20.  
72 Thomas Elkjer Nissen, #TheWeaponizationOfSocialMedia (Copenhagen, Denmark: Royal Danish 
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stakeouts, wiretaps, and letter intercepts were sufficient tools to gain intel on potential 
terrorists.76 Terrorists’ use of the internet has changed that notion. Domestically, LEAs 
are using social media for investigations. The 2016 Annual Social Media Survey by the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police reports that 70 percent of the 539 agencies 
responding use social media for intelligence gathering.77 The trend internationally is 
similar. The Australian government, however, says that social media creates a significant 
challenge.78 France has made it a priority to strengthen its efforts in cyberspace.79 
According to Public Security Minister Gilad Erdan in 2018, Israel thwarted over 200 
Palestinian terrorist attacks by using intelligence gathered on social media platforms.80 
Consensus exists among the security experts that the internet has changed policing.  
In 2012, Omand et al. appear to have introduced the term SOCMINT and argued 
for its inclusion in the intelligence framework.81 The security experts now contend that 
SOCMINT is “integral” to ensuring national security.82 Marzell explains SOCMINT’s fit 
in the wider intelligence mix and its “essential” role in informed decision making.83 
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Akhgar, Staniforth, and Taipale go as far as to contend that using SOCMINT in the fight 
against terrorism is “mandatory” or part of the “duty” to safeguard the homeland.84  
Security experts in the United Kingdom (UK) view the terrorists’ use of the 
internet as a global risk that affects its security daily and directly.85 In 2016, the UK’s 
Centre of Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence & Organised Crime Research 
(CENTRIC) launched the Open-source Intelligence (OSINT) Hub, “which has been 
gaining momentum as a physical and virtual space for the operational exploitation, 
dissemination, and development of CENTRIC capabilities.”86 The OSINT Hub’s secure 
physical environment facilitates collaboration between investigators, the CENTRIC team 
and their tools, and developers who seek input for creating future capabilities.87 The UK 
pursued a collaborative approach to tool development with reTriEval and aNalysis of 
heterogeneouS online content for terrOrist activity Recognition (TENSOR) and Detecting 
and ANalysing TErrorist-related online contents and financing activities (DANTE). The 
UK partnered with different countries, different LEAs, academia, and industry forming 
consortiums and using advisory boards.  
One apparent gap in the security expert literature concerns the role SOCMINT 
plays in immigration. Karasek argues that immigration officials have an advantage in the 
SOCMINT terrorist discovery endeavor—the officials have relatively complete and 
reliable sets of personal data submitted by the applicants themselves on immigration 
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forms.88 Thus, the security experts agree SOCMINT has significant value, but some 
minor variance exists among experts concerning the extent of that value.  
3. Critics 
The literature from those who object to SOCMINT, the critics, can be parsed into 
three camps—those who object because the effort has been problematic and is 
unnecessary, those who object on efficacy grounds, and those who object because of data 
and constitutional concerns. The first group in the critics’ camp contends that DHS’ 
efforts to develop a SOCMINT capability have been problematic and that it is 
unnecessary. Patel et al. argue that the prior DHS SOCMINT efforts are an inadequate 
basis to expand the initiative.89 The authors allege that DHS’ efforts were problematic 
because the efforts did not evaluate effectiveness, lacked policies and procedures, and 
found little value from the undertaking.90 Bier argues that vetting failures are infrequent, 
especially after 9/11.91 He provides a detailed analysis to make the case that the United 
States is safe enough and that new vetting initiatives are unnecessary.92 Inserra also 
dismisses the risk from those abroad.93 He posits:  
Given that since the start of 2015, all 30 Islamists plots and attacks against 
the U.S. homeland have involved a homegrown terrorist, the U.S. must not 
shift resources away from countering such threats in order to start broad 
social media vetting efforts.94  
                                               
88 Piotr Karasek, “Social Media Intelligence as a Tool for Immigration and National Security 
Purposes,” Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 10, no. 19 (October 15, 2018): 
409, http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-962674c1-cf33-4a36-bab4-
112cd141bac1/c/PBW_19_-_Karasek_-_angielska_wersja.pdf.  
89 Patel et al., “Social Media Monitoring,” 4.  
90 Patel et al., 31.  
91 David J. Bier, “Extreme Vetting of Immigrants: Estimating Terrorism Vetting Failures,” CATO 
Institute, April 17, 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/extreme-vetting-immigrants-
estimating-terrorism-vetting-failures.  
92 Bier.  
93 Inserra, “The U.S. Should Tread Carefully on Social Media Vetting.”  
94 Inserra.  
17 
Patel et al. challenge the notion that value exists in focusing resources on this initiative 
based on a low hit rate in previous efforts.95 Absent from these three views is the reality 
that the war against terrorism is dynamic. What worked yesterday may not work in the 
future. Sagarin agrees with this non-stasis view and asserts that the answer to security 
threats lies in understanding nature, specifically adaptability because terrorism threats are 
constantly evolving.96 McChrystal, the former Commander of the Joint Special 
Operations Command and former Commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, contends it 
is futile to rely on historic principles in wars where a unique enemy and innovations are 
at play.97 This disagreement is a critical because if the absence of risk forecloses 
SOCMINT’s necessity, the efficacy and data and constitutionality questions become 
irrelevant.  
The second group in the critics’ camp takes issue with the efficacy of SOCMINT. 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) fears SOCMINT vetting will slow down 
visa processing.98 The ACLU also argues there is “no reason to believe collecting and 
retaining this kind of social media information will improve our security.”99 The ACLU 
asserts, “Anyone actually engaged in terrorism will simply take additional steps to hide 
their communications, making this information collection ineffective.”100 The ACLU 
warns of the subjectivity of social media vetting and the lack of transparency and redress 
for benefit denials.101 The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) contends 
SOCMINT potentially causes irreversible harm and tells the story of a Facebook 
algorithm erroneously machine translating the Arabic post “good morning” to “attack 
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them” and “hurt them.”102 However, EPIC neglected to disclose that the mishap occurred 
because the Israeli police failed to consult an Arabic speaker to confirm the machine 
translation prior to the arrest.103 Inserra contends that the United States’ use of social 
media for vetting “may be unwise because of retaliatory or reciprocal actions taken by 
other countries” that may demand social media information of travelers from the United 
States.104 Inserra also argues that based on events, such as the breach of the Office of 
Personnel Management, travelers to the United States would have substantial cause to be 
apprehensive about the security of their social media data once in the government’s 
hands.105  
The last group in the critics’ camp warns of data and constitutional concerns. 
Patel et al. raise concerns that SOCMINT data use, retention, and sharing will risk data 
misinterpretation.106 The ACLU asserts that using SOCMINT to vet immigrants raises 
constitutional concerns regarding the rights to due process, free speech and expression, 
and it impacts the privacy of millions of people living in the United States, including U.S. 
citizens.107 Levinson raises concerns about SOCMINT and the First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments, but is silent on SOCMINT’s use for immigration vetting.108 
EPIC echoes the others’ concerns on privacy and civil liberties being at risk in a number 
of scenarios including immigration vetting.109 Patel et al. raise efficacy, data, and 
constitutional concerns.110 Marthews and Tucker present a paper arguing that a chilling 
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effect occurs in Google search behavior based on increased awareness of government 
surveillance.111 Mund explores government monitoring of social media in Fourth 
Amendment terms.112 In an ACLU Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, 
Handeyside and Cagle contend that DHS’ social media screening lacks protections 
against discrimination and profiling and warn of the risks of abuse.113 The purported 
constitutional concerns have caused strong opposition by the critics.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis explores the necessity and efficacy of open-source SOCMINT in 
identifying potential fraud, public safety, and/or national security concerns (threats) from 
immigrants seeking immigration benefits from USCIS. This study contributes to the 
research literature in the field by filling the gap in the literature on open-source 
SOCMINT threat detection necessity and efficacy among immigrants seeking 
immigration benefits. A mixed-method research approach is used in this thesis that is 
both quantitative and qualitative. This approach assists in answering the research question 
and related questions, and evaluating the underlying evidence supporting those answers. 
This research is both theoretical and applied. It is theoretical in the sense that it explores 
the critics’ beliefs and assumptions concerning their objections to SOCMINT. This 
research is applied because it explores how USCIS can use SOCMINT to assist in 
fulfilling its mission.  
Data is collected from open-sources for both the quantitative and qualitative 
facets of this research. In order to gain better insight into the viability of using SOCMINT 
to identify threats among immigration benefit seekers, quantitative data from the Profiles 
of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) dataset is used. The PIRUS 
dataset contains “deidentified individual-level information on the backgrounds, attributes, 
and radicalization processes of over 2,100 violent and non-violent extremists who adhere 
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to far right, far left, Islamist, or single issue ideologies in the United States covering 
1948–2017,” which was coded entirely using information from public sources.114 Access 
to the full PIRUS downloadable dataset was acquired by completing an end user license 
agreement with the University of Maryland. A public, limited version of the PIRUS 
dataset is also available online for use with the Keshif data visualization tool as shown in 
Figure 11 in the Appendix.  
To gain better insight on the arguments for and against SOCMINT, qualitative 
data is used. This qualitative data is secondary source data on the issue rhetoric—the 
debate and discussion—between the critics and supporters of implementing SOCMINT. 
This rhetoric exists in the open-source literature, e.g., books, scholarly journals, articles, 
news stories, FOIA-released documents, and government reports and memorandums. The 
collection of the issue rhetoric data is limited to the post-San Bernardino attack literature, 
spanning the period of December 22, 2015 to May 22, 2019. The research also includes 
pre- and post-San Bernardino literature that contains general, non-issue rhetoric insights 
on SOCMINT. Collectively, the research literature includes over 150 sources.  
The method used to analyze the data varied by the data type, quantitative and 
qualitative. For the quantitative data, the narrow scope and reasonable size of the PIRUS 
dataset eliminated the need for Statistical Package for the Social Sciences data analysis. 
Instead, the author was able to use Microsoft Excel’s sort, filter, count, and sum features 
to manipulate and graph the raw data. The author confirmed the dataset did not contain 
any outliers or missing data values. The existing PIRUS coded variables were sufficient 
for the thesis research. All coded variables and their associated response values were 
defined based on the October 2018 public release version of the PIRUS Codebook.  
Compound aggregating and excluding filters were applied among the coded 
variables. These filtering rules are explicitly stated in Chapter II’s PIRUS variable 
analysis sections 7(a)–(i). As the research focuses on radicalized immigrants who would 
have interacted with the lawful immigration process, the “Residency_Status” variable 
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was used to eliminate U.S.-born subjects and those who were undocumented residents. 
The details of any exclusion and revision to the subject population and filtered sub-
populations are explicitly stated in Chapter II’s PIRUS variable analysis sections 7(a)–(i). 
When coded variable data values were reported as “unknown,” those cases were excluded 
from the analysis. These exclusions are explicitly stated in Chapter II’s PIRUS variable 
analysis sections 7(a)–(i). When data values were logically unresponsive to specific 
questions, e.g., internet analysis before 1995 and social media analysis before 2005, those 
cases were excluded from the analysis. These exclusions are explicitly stated in Chapter 
II’s PIRUS variable analysis sections 7(a)–(i).  
For the qualitative data, the specific objections of the critics were identified and 
attributed. The objections were grouped by type, e.g., problematic effort, necessity, 
efficacy, data concerns, and constitutional concerns. The evidence that the critics provide 
for each objection is presented. The evidence supporting each objection is traced to its 
original source. Any direct contradictions in the evidence are identified and the 
contradictions cited, often in direct quotes to eliminate any potential interpretive bias 
from paraphrasing. The author identifies when select statements offered by the critics as 
supporting evidence are taken in isolation and ignore broader contradicting context. In 
addition, direct quotes are used liberally to eliminate any potential interpretive bias from 
paraphrasing. Using the identified contradictions and other scholarly research, rebuttals to 
the critics’ objections are proffered.  
The mixed-method research approach was beneficial. The quantitative 
methodology was ideal for measuring and identifying patterns among the PIRUS cases. 
The methodology provided a practical, evidence-grounded means to gain insight into 
radicalized immigrants’ use of the internet and social media in plotting violent attacks 
and the potential for threat detection. The qualitative methodology was ideal for 
interpreting and gaining fact-based insight on the critics’ objections and offering 
plausible rebuttals. Collectively, the quantitative and qualitative methods provided 
answers to the central research question and related questions. The methods facilitated a 
deeper understanding of SOCMINT and provided a framework for analyzing the merit of 
the critics’ objection narratives.  
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F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II describes the USCIS mission and the authorities permitting 
SOCMINT. The chapter provides insight into how terrorists, in general, use social media 
and the experts’ assessments of it as a tool. The PIRUS section examines radicalized 
immigrants’ social media use. The chapter contemplates open-source necessity, current 
law enforcement use, and SOCMINT success stories.  
Chapter III introduces the issue rhetoric as objections from those in the first camp 
of critics in the literature review. The chapter details why the critics label SOCMINT 
problematic based on the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report and FOIA-released 
documents. The chapter explores the claim that SOCMINT is not necessary because the 
United States is safe enough. The chapter explains how the objections, if not overcome, 
make the case for not using SOCMINT. The chapter analyzes each of the objections and 
the supporting evidence offered by the critics. Where available, the chapter provides 
rebuttals to the specific objections of those opposing SOCMINT. The rebuttals derive 
from a detailed analysis of the OIG and FOIA-released documents’ text cited by the 
critics and other open-source government documents.  
Chapter IV analyzes the efficacy issues identified in the second camp of critics. 
The chapter examines each of the objections and the supporting evidence offered by 
those who object to SOCMINT on efficacy grounds. The chapter informs how the merits 
of the objections affect the propositions for SOCMINT. The chapter relies on quantitative 
analysis of the PIRUS dataset, experts’ opinions, a detailed analysis of the OIG and 
FOIA-released documents’ text cited by the critics, and other open-source government 
documents to provide counterarguments, where feasible.  
Chapter V addresses the data and constitutional concerns identified by those in the 
last camp who oppose SOCMINT. Each of the objections and supporting evidence are 
evaluated on their merit. The chapter describes how the objections, if not overcome, 
persuade against using SOCMINT. Rebuttals that stem from open-source government 
documents detailing DHS policy, procedure, and training are offered.  
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Chapter VI presents recommendations and conclusions based on the propositions 
for SOCMINT and the analysis of objections and rebuttals contained in Chapters III 
through V. The chapter synthesizes the propositions for SOCMINT and the objections to 
it into legal, ethical, implementation, technology, and organizational recommendations. 
The chapter concludes by proposing facets of SOCMINT warranting further study.  
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II. PROPOSITIONS FOR SOCMINT 
Before the advent of the internet, extremists had to peddle hate on the 
street corner or through phone conversations to convince people to accept 
literature or attend meetings. Now, hate and terrorist propaganda can 
easily be posted on blogs or social media where it spreads exponentially 
and has immeasurable impact.  
—Samuel G. Estes, author, 
Hate: The Shared Heritage of International and Domestic Extremism 
 
 
For terrorists this struggle isn’t about how many terrorists exist today; it’s 
about how many will be created tomorrow. Their recruitment efforts 
entirely depend on how we act.  
—Mike German, author, 
Thinking Like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent 
 
 
Proposition: An open-source SOCMINT gathering and analysis capability will 
critically assist USCIS in accomplishing its homeland security mission.  
Assessing this claim requires understanding the context and environment within 
which USCIS operates. First, a SOCMINT capability must advance the objectives of 
USCIS’ mission. Second, USCIS must operate under legal authorities that allow 
SOCMINT. Third, social media needs to be a fertile source for threats. Fourth, the open-
source information discovered using SOCMINT should not be taken for granted in efforts 
to identify threats. Fifth, while not entirely determinative of USCIS’ SOCMINT success, 
it is beneficial if other LEAs also operate in this space, which indicates viability and 
provides opportunities for partnering and sharing best practices. Lastly, the SOCMINT 
endeavor must be capable of moving beyond threat identification to successful 
intervention. A review of these considerations reveals that SOCMINT can offer a 
significant contribution to USCIS’ efforts to fulfill its homeland security mission.  
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A. MISSION 
Identifying fraud, public safety, and/or national security threats is central to 
achieving the USCIS mission. The SOCMINT initiative should complement the 
objectives of the USCIS mission. USCIS “administers the nation’s lawful immigration 
system, safeguarding its integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly adjudicating 
requests for immigration benefits while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, 
and honoring our values.”115 In 2004, USCIS formed the FDNS directorate to enhance 
the integrity of the U.S. immigration system and to safeguard against individuals 
receiving or eligible to receive immigration benefits that may constitute a threat to 
national security and/or public safety.116 Immigration benefit fraud prevention also falls 
within the FDNS mandate.117 Individuals who constitute a national security and/or 
public safety threat may use fraud in an attempt to hide their identity, immigration 
history, criminal history, person and group associations, immigration benefit eligibility 
issues, etc.  
Internally, to carry out FDNS directives, FDNS immigration officers (IOs) work 
with Field Operations Directorate adjudications immigration services officers (ISOs).118 
IOs are tasked with performing administrative inquiries regarding suspected benefit fraud 
and assisting with the resolution of criminal or national security concerns.119 Therefore, 
IOs conduct administrative investigations to identify pertinent information necessary to 
provide sound adjudication decisions.120 IOs report their investigative findings to the 
ISOs who make the final adjudicative decisions in granting immigration benefits.121 The 
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IOs and ISOs collaborate to investigate fraud, public safety, and/or national security 
concerns thoroughly before USCIS grants immigration benefits.122  
Externally, FDNS serves as the principal conduit for collaboration and 
information sharing among other state and federal government agencies.123 As the 9/11 
Commission contends, information sharing is critical to connecting the dots.124 FDNS is 
the liaison between USCIS and the intelligence and law enforcement agencies.125 This 
role requires collaboration to ensure that fraudsters, criminals, and terrorists who pose a 
threat to the integrity of the system, public safety, and/or national security cannot “exploit 
the immigration system to gain access to, or remain in, the United States.”126  
In performing these internal and external functions, FDNS consults various 
publicly available and open source internet-based resources during its investigations.127 
These sources include the “internet, social media, news feeds, and state and local public 
records.”128 Access to these resources allows the IOs to verify personal, biographical, 
historical, and financial information and to identify potential immigration benefit fraud, 
public safety, and/or national security concerns.129 As social media is a potentially rich 
source of information on applicants, beneficiaries, and petitioners, it may provide IOs 
with indicators of potential fraud, public safety, and/or national security threats 
contemplated by the USCIS mission.  
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B. LEGAL AUTHORITIES 
USCIS has the legal authority to operate a SOCMINT capability. FDNS’ 
collection and analysis of social media data used for adjudicating immigration benefits 
must meet its security needs, but must also be permissive under U.S. law. The authority 
to accomplish these ends derives from the INA and delegations from the Secretary of 
Homeland Security. The INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. grants USCIS the authority to 
adjudicate immigration benefits.130 The Secretary delegated USCIS the authority to 
administer the immigration laws, investigate alleged civil and criminal violations of the 
immigration laws, make prosecutorial recommendations, maintain files and records 
systems, interrogate aliens, issue subpoenas, administer oaths, and take and consider 
evidence.131 The Appropriations Act of 2005 authorizes USCIS to conduct background 
and law enforcement checks on applicants, beneficiaries, and petitioners before granting 
immigration benefits.132 Collectively, these authority grants provide the legal basis for 
allowing FDNS IOs to search open-source internet and social media information while 
conducting administrative inquiries.  
C. TERRORISM ON SOCIAL MEDIA 
Social media is a fertile domain to identify fraud, public safety, and/or national 
security threats. Spence and Gardham frame the issue as a paradigm shift—historically, 
stakeouts, wiretaps, and letter intercepts were sufficient tools to gain intel on potential 
terrorists.133 Terrorists’ use of the internet has changed that notion. Terrorists use the 
internet to disseminate propaganda, solicit new members, communicate, gather 
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intelligence, seek money, and inspire and plan attacks.134 A review of some specific 
examples of how terrorists have used the internet indicates support for the claim that 
FDNS should not be overlooking social media in its quest to identify fraud, public safety, 
and/or national security threats.  
1. Propaganda 
A long established and growing trend of terrorist propaganda has appeared on 
social media. Pro-al-Qaeda supporters created their first website in the 1990s.135 In mid-
2015, ISIS produced “38 individual batches of propaganda each day,” which 
concentrated on various themes, such as “victimhood, war, and utopia,” with lesser 
themes involving “mercy, belonging, and brutality.”136 A review by Bloomberg 
Businessweek shows that “at least a dozen U.S.-designated terror groups maintain a 
presence on Facebook” including “Hamas and Hezbollah in the Middle East, Boko 
Haram in West Africa, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.”137 In the first 
quarter of 2018, Facebook identified almost two million pieces of al-Qaeda and ISIS 
material, nearly double the amount in the previous quarter.138 In the last two quarters of 
2017, Twitter banned almost 275,000 accounts for promoting terrorism.139 Terrorist 
propaganda on social media potentially presents FDNS an opportunity to identify fraud, 
public safety, and/or national security threats.  
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2. Communication 
Aside from generalized propaganda, terrorists use social media to communicate 
directly. In 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) said “its investigation found 
that [Waheba Issa] Dais used hacked social media accounts to discuss possible attacks 
with self-proclaimed members of the IS [Islamic State].”140 The FBI reported, “Dais 
suggested using the deadly toxin ricin in a government building or a reservoir somewhere 
in the U.S. during one of her conversations with an informant.”141 Also, “she suggested 
street festivals and summer celebrations as possible targets.”142 Such dialog on social 
media potentially offers FDNS a means to identify fraud, public safety, and/or national 
security threats.  
3. Recruiting 
Social media exponentially extends the communication reach of users, which can 
play a critical role in recruiting. A Saudi program, the Sakina Campaign for Dialogue, 
scrutinized the Twitter accounts of Saudis who back extremist groups, and based on the 
analysis of 200 Twitter accounts and hashtags related to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in 
Saudi Arabia, uncovered a “dangerous movement” organized by Saudis supporting the 
militant groups on Twitter.143 The campaign director stated, “An average of 90 tweets 
per minute (129,600 per day) call for violence, to join terrorist groups, to attack others 
verbally or physically, or to destabilize security.”144 The flurry of recruiting efforts on 
social media may assist FDNS in its mission to thwart fraud, public safety, and/or 
national security threats.  
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Social media recruiting plays a decisive role in radicalization. In 2014, social 
media was “cited prominently in the FBI’s criminal complaint” for terrorist Nicholas 
Teausant.145 Teausant posted “pictures under the name ‘bigolsmurf,’ declaring his desire 
to ‘join Allah’s army’ and seeking ‘The Mujahid’s Handbook,’ identified by the FBI as a 
‘how-to guide for becoming a lone wolf terrorist,’ compiled from Al Qaeda’s Inspire 
magazine.”146 On ask.fm, a question and answer social network platform, “he allegedly 
told strangers of his desire to ‘go fight in Syria.’”147 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, an 
assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security studies program said, “You can 
really trace this guy’s evolution through his social media postings, you can see exactly 
what he was thinking during parts of his radicalization, it’s really striking.”148 Signals of 
radicalization on social media may help FDNS uncover fraud, public safety, and/or 
national security threats.  
5. Plotting 
Social media can aid terrorists in planning attacks, both for materials acquisition 
and tactics discovery. In 2016, “[b]efore Ahmad Khan Rahami planted bombs in New 
York and New Jersey, he bought bomb-making materials on eBay” and “linked to jihad-
related videos from his public social-media account.”149 In 2017, Uzbek immigrant 
Sayfullo Saipov was “charged with the death of eight people after ploughing into them 
with a truck in downtown Manhattan.”150 Saipov is also “‘accused of providing material 
support and resources’ to the terror group ISIS.”151 John Miller, the New York Police 
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Department’s Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism, told reporters 
that “Saipov appeared to have followed almost exactly to a ‘T’ the instructions that ISIS 
has put out in its social media channels before, with instructions to their followers on how 
to carry out such an attack.”152 How terrorists use social media for planning potentially 
presents FDNS an opportunity to identify fraud, public safety, and/or national security 
threats.  
6. Experts 
Security experts agree about the viability of using SOCMINT to identify 
terrorists. Nick Rasmussen, former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, 
believes, “Increasingly, what connecting the dots means to me is dealing with the huge, 
huge volume of publicly available or open source or unclassified information that’s out 
there that may have terrorism relevance.”153 William Roper, former Director of the 
DoD’s Strategic Capabilities Office said, “Data is going to be the fundamental fuel for 
national security in this century.”154 Isaac Porche, a Research and Development 
Corporation (RAND) researcher, argues “the potential is huge, especially if the 
information can be combined with other databases.”155 The aforementioned examples 
and the experts’ assertions leave little doubt that a potential opportunity exists to identify 
terrorists on social media.  
7. Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States 
The experts and the previous examples support the notion that terrorists use social 
media and an opportunity exists to intervene, but this offers little insight on FDNS’ 
principal focus, immigrants. PIRUS, a project by the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), is somewhat instructive on the nexus 
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between immigrants and use of the internet and social media in the terrorism context.156 
PIRUS is a dataset that “contains deidentified individual-level information on the 
backgrounds, attributes, and radicalization processes of over 2,100 violent and non-
violent extremists who adhere to far right, far left, Islamist, or single issue ideologies in 
the United States covering 1948–2017.”157 The PIRUS dataset leads to some conclusions 
regarding the role the internet and social media played in the radicalization and terrorist 
plots of immigrants.  
a. Radicalized Immigrants 
A small percentage of individuals who have radicalized have had contact with the 
lawful immigration system. This phenomenon is important because it indicates FDNS 
may have an opportunity to identify fraud, public safety, and/or national security threats 
among immigration benefit seekers. The PIRUS variable “Residency_Status” reports, 
“What was the individual’s residency status in the United States at the time of 
exposure?”158 In this context, exposure means the date the “activity/plot first came to 
public attention...usually time of incident or arrest, or earliest mention of individual in 
sources, so long as these are related to the plot/radicalization.”159 The residency status 
variable’s categorical descriptors include Born Citizen, Naturalized Citizen, Legal [sic] 
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Permanent Resident, Temporary Resident, Undocumented Resident, and Unknown.160 
The subjects in this population of particular interest to FDNS are those who would have 
had interaction with the lawful immigration process. Eliminating subjects whose 
residency status is unknown reduces the PIRUS dataset’s population from 2,148 to 2,024. 
Filtering out the subjects who were U.S.-born and those who were undocumented 
residents further revises the population size to 206. Therefore, 206 of the 2,024 subjects 
(10.18 percent), hereinafter “radicalized immigrants,” interacted with the lawful 
immigration system, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 Residency status of the radicalized at the time of exposure161  
The PIRUS dataset’s focus on subjects who radicalized within the United States 
does not foreclose applying conclusions from this dataset to subjects seeking entry into 
the United States, which is the focus of USCIS’ SOCMINT efforts. The 206 radicalized 
immigrants radicalized within the United States, but the subjects would have had multiple 
contacts with USCIS after arriving as they progressed through the immigration benefit 
system, from lawful permanent resident to naturalized citizen. In addition, the 
“External_Rad” variable reports, “Did any latter period of the individual’s radicalization 
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occur outside the United States?”162 The results of this query are known for 114 of the 
206 radicalized immigrants. Research indicates, “at least some part of the radicalization 
process occurred outside the United States” for 44 of the subjects (38.6 percent), as 
shown in Figure 2.163 The external radicalization and contact with USCIS makes the 
subjects in the PIRUS dataset reasonably analogous to the subjects of SOCMINT’s focus.  
 
 Location of latter period radicalization164  
b. Internet Radicalization 
The internet played a significant role with the aforementioned 206 radicalized 
immigrants. Secondary research with the PIRUS dataset supports this conclusion. This 
finding is relevant because use of the internet in the radicalization process may create an 
opportunity for FDNS to identify fraud, public safety, and/or national security threats. 
The “Internet_Radicalization” variable reports, “What role did the internet play in the 
individual’s radicalization?”165 Adjusting for radicalization that occurred before 1995 
and cases in which the internet’s role in radicalization is unknown reduces the 206 
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radicalized immigrant subpopulation to 118 subjects.166 Isolating the 
“Internet_Radicalization” variable reveals that the “Internet played a role but was not the 
primary means of radicalization (e.g., internet resources were used to reaffirm or advance 
pre-existing radical beliefs)” in 72 of 118 of the subjects (61.02 percent).167 
Manipulating the “Internet_Radicalization” variable reveals that the “Internet was the 
primary means of radicalization for the individual (e.g., initial exposure to ideology and 
subsequent radicalization occurred online)” in 31 of 118 of the subjects (26.27 percent), 
as shown in Figure 3.168 The internet played at least some role for over a majority of the 
radicalized immigrants, which potentially creates an opportunity for threat identification.  
 
 Role of the internet in radicalization169  
c. Social Media Radicalization 
Social media played a significant role with the aforementioned 206 radicalized 
immigrants. Secondary research with the PIRUS dataset supports this conclusion. While 
FDNS investigations do involve open-source content on the internet, the SOCMINT 
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initiative is more focused on open-source data from social media sites. Therefore, use of 
social media sites by radicalized immigrants may present an opportunity for FDNS to 
identify fraud, public safety, and/or national security threats. The “Social_Media” 
variable in the PIRUS dataset reports, “Is there evidence that online social media played a 
role in the individual’s radicalization and/or mobilization?”170 PIRUS defines online 
social media as “any form of electronic communication through which users create online 
communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content, such as 
videos and images.”171 Adjusting for radicalization that occurred before 2005 and cases 
in which social media’s role in radicalization is unknown reduces the 206 radicalized 
immigrant subpopulation to 113 subjects.172 Isolating the “Social_Media” variable 
identifies that social media “played a role but was not the primary means of radicalization 
or mobilization” in 55 of the 113 subjects (48.67 percent), as shown in Figure 4.173 
Analyzing the “Social_Media” variable reveals that social media “was the primary means 
of radicalization for the individual (e.g., initial exposure to ideology and subsequent 
radicalization occurred over online social media)” in 14 of the 113 subjects (12.39 
percent), as shown in Figure 4.174 Social media played at least some role for 69, a 
majority, of the radicalized immigrants, which potentially creates an opportunity for 
threat identification.  
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 Role of social media in radicalization175  
d. Internet Plotting by Social Media Users 
The internet plays a role in terrorist plots for radicalized immigrants who use 
social media. The PIRUS variable “Internet_Use_Plot” contemplates if the “extremist 
activity involved a violent plot, did the individual use the internet for communications or 
logistics while preparing for and undertaking the plot?”176 For example, “using the 
internet to communicate with group members or other extremists, threatening targets, 
researching the target and tactics, and ordering supplies.”177 Coupling this variable with 
“Social_Media” may provide some insight on the extent of FDNS opportunities to 
intervene when radicalized immigrants who use social media also use the internet for 
plotting terrorist attacks. Adjusting the group size of the 69 radicalized immigrants that 
social media played at least some role in their radicalization to include only those 
subjects whose internet plot use was known and the plot occurred after 1995 reduces this 
group to 23 subjects.178 Isolating the “Internet_Use_Plot” variable identifies that 20 of 
the subjects (86.96 percent) used the internet in conjunction with their plot preparations, 
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as shown in Figure 5. This finding supports that the internet is fertile ground for FDNS 
potentially to identify threats among radicalized immigrant social media users.  
 
 Use of the internet for logistics or communication in preparation 
of a violent plot179  
e. Gravity of Threat from Social Media Users 
Radicalized immigrant social media users, regardless of internet plot use, pose a 
serious threat. Of this group of 69 subjects, one-third of the subjects were doers versus 
talkers. The variable “Extent_Plot,” explores, “If the individual’s extremist activity 
involved a violent plot, to what extent did the plot progress? I.e., how far did the planning 
and execution proceed?”180 The extent of the plot was known for the entire group of 69 
radicalized immigrants that social media played at least some role in their radicalization. 
Seven of the 69 subjects (10.14 percent), the talkers, had a “Nebulous plot (general ideas 
only, threats made to targets in the absence of an [y] planning or preparation).”181 One of 
the 69 subjects (1.45 percent) “Attempted acquisition of materials for plot.”182 Eleven of 
the 69 subjects (15.94 percent) successfully acquired and possessed materials for their 
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plot.183 Five of the 69 subjects (7.25 percent) attempted, but failed in executing their 
plot.184 Six of the 69 subjects (8.7 percent) successfully executed their plot.185 
Collectively, 23 of the 69 subjects (33.33 percent), the doers, took action on carrying out 
their terrorist plots. The significant number of cases that posed a serious threat highlights 
the need for FDNS to deploy SOCMINT, as shown in Figure 6.  
 
 Gravity of threat from social media users186  
f. Operational Security 
Operational security efforts do not completely foreclose the opportunity to 
identify threats when a terrorist plot exists. FDNS efforts to identify fraud, public safety, 
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and/or national security threats are potentially frustrated by the operational security 
efforts of the nefarious to hide or conceal their plots. The “Op_Security” variable 
identifies, “If the individual’s first publicly known extremist activity involved a violent 
plot, did the individual attempt to hide or conceal preparation for the plot?”187 The 
operational security efforts are known for 20 of the 23 doers—those who took steps to 
execute their terrorist plots. Secondary research based on the “Op_Security” variable 
reveals that of the doers, two subjects (10 percent) were “openly vocal about the plot 
(discussed it with friends and associates, procured suspicious supplies—like explosives 
or weapons—without being discrete, etc.).”188 The PIRUS data indicates that four of the 
20 subjects (20 percent) were “neither covert nor overt (did not discuss the plot openly or 
overtly procure supplies, but also did not attempt to hide activities).”189 The remaining 
14 subjects (70 percent) “avoided discussion with friends and associates and used code 
words when discussing the plot, procured supplies through intermediaries or in areas 
outside place of habitation or target area, etc.).”190 Nonexistent or lax operational 
security practices may assist FDNS in identifying fraud, public safety, and/or national 
security threats, as shown in Figure 7.  
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 Attempts to hide or conceal preparation for the plot (Operational 
Security)191  
g. Social Media Frequency 
Over a majority of radicalized immigrants used social media at least once a day 
for activities related to radicalization and/or mobilization. Arguably, the frequency of this 
type of activity may affect the likelihood that FDNS can detect a threat via SOCMINT. 
The “Social_Media_Frequency” variable reports, “If there is evidence that online social 
media played a role in the individual’s radicalization and/or mobilization, on average 
how often did the individual engage in social media-related activity related to 
radicalization and/or mobilization?”192 The variable categories include “Rarely (about 
once a month or less),” “Sporadically (about 2–3 times per month),” “Occasionally 
(about once a week),” “Frequently (about once a day),” and “Continually (multiple times 
per day).”193 PIRUS reports the social media frequency for 34 of the 206 radicalized 
immigrants, as shown in Figure 8. None of the subjects rarely used social media. Two of 
the subjects (5.88 percent) used social media sporadically. Eleven of the subjects (32.35 
percent) occasionally used social media. Sixteen of the subjects (47.06 percent) had 
frequent social media use. Only five of the subjects (14.71 percent) continually used 
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social media. Therefore, over 61 percent of the subjects used social media at least daily in 
a manner that related to radicalization and/or mobilization. This frequency may assist 
FDNS in identifying fraud, public safety, and/or national security threats.  
 
 Frequency of social media use related to radicalization or 
mobilization194  
h. Social Media Activities 
The radicalized immigrants are not passive content consumers, which increases 
the need for SOCMINT. Passive content consumption of terrorism-related social media is 
not likely to trigger FDNS scrutiny via SOCMINT. However, more nefarious activities 
would. Consequently, the nature of social media activities affects the likelihood of threat 
detection. The “Social_Media_Activities” variable considers, “If there is evidence that 
online social media played a role in the individual’s radicalization and/or mobilization, 
which types of social media-related activities did the individual participate in?”195 
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Adjusting for radicalization that occurred before 2005 and cases in which the social 
media activities were unknown reduces the 206 radicalized immigrant subpopulation to 
63 subjects.196 Only three of the 63 subjects (4.76 percent) limited their activities to 
passive content consumption. Participation by “Disseminating content (i.e., sharing, 
spreading existing content)” was the most prevalent with a total of 41 of the 63 subjects 
(65.08 percent).197 Thirty-seven of the 63 subjects (58.73 percent) participated in 
extremist dialogue (i.e., creating unsophisticated content).198 Communicating directly 
with members of an extremist group to facilitate foreign travel accounted for 19 of the 63 
subjects’ (30.16 percent) activity.199 The fourth most common activity, capturing 16 of 
the 63 subjects (25.40 percent), involved, “Directly communicating with members of 
extremist group(s) to establish relationship/acquire information on extremist ideology (no 
communication on specific travel plans or plot).”200 Fourteen of the 63 subjects (22.22 
percent) created propaganda/content (e.g., creating extremist manifestos, propaganda 
videos, etc.).201 The act of “Directly communicating with members of extremist group(s) 
to facilitate domestic attack” came in last, with six of the 63 subjects (9.52 percent) 
engaged.202 The nature of social media activities indicates a plethora of activity that can 
potentially trigger SOCMINT scrutiny, as shown in Figure 9.  
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 Social media activities203  
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i. Previous Criminal Activity 
SOCMINT may provide FDNS an opportunity to identify threats that otherwise 
may go undetected during traditional immigration benefit processing. A central means 
FDNS uses to identify threats is querying immigration benefit seekers against 
government systems that hold criminal and intelligence records. If the subject had no 
previous criminal activity and consequently no previous arrests, this method may fail to 
identify a potential threat. Subjects with no previous criminal activity, but who use social 
media for nefarious purposes may expose themselves to FDNS SOCMINT threat 
identification efforts. The variable for “Previous_Criminal_Activity” reports, “Prior to 
their radicalization, does the individual have a history of involvement in non-
ideologically motivated criminal activities?”204 The previous criminal activity was 
known for 57 of the 69 radicalized immigrants for whom social media played at least 
some role in their radicalization. Of this group of 57 subjects, 43 subjects (75.44 percent) 
had “No previous criminal activity,” as shown in Figure 10.205 SOCMINT may provide 
an opportunity to identify threats from subjects not contained in criminal databases.  
 
 History of involvement in non-ideologically motivated criminal 
activities206  
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D. OPEN-SOURCE NECESSITY 
Leveraging open-source methods is a necessary tool in the fraud, public safety, 
and/or national security threat discovery effort. Terrorists have no qualms about using 
open-source platforms, nor should FDNS when protecting the homeland. An al-Qaeda 
training manual discovered in Afghanistan advised that 80 percent of the information 
needed for attacking an enemy could be found in open sources.207 Terrorists synthesize 
this research into instructions. The 600-page Encyclopedia of Jihad is widely circulated 
online and includes chapters, such as “how to kill,” “explosive devices,” “manufacturing 
detonators,” and “assassination with mines.”208 This example supports Nissen’s 
argument that terrorists have weaponized social media.209  
The Australian government describes the internet as “the command and control 
networks of choice for terrorists.”210 Some counterterrorism experts label the internet as 
a “terrorist university, a place where terrorists can learn new techniques and skills to 
make them more effective in their attack methodologies.”211 Governor Kean, former 
chairman of the 9/11 Commission, reports that “many experts predict that the decline of 
the Islamic State’s territorial caliphate will lead it to redouble its efforts in the digital 
realm, seeking to remotely inspire and direct violence in the West.”212 Harman argues, 
“The use of spies to gather human intelligence will become less valuable than open-
source intelligence, especially information gleaned from social media.”213 Wilson 
contends, “Ninety percent of intelligence comes from open sources. The other ten 
percent, the clandestine work, is just the more dramatic. The real intelligence hero is 
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Sherlock Holmes, not James Bond.”214 FDNS would be remiss in its efforts to secure the 
homeland if it ignored the necessity for detecting threats in open-source social media.  
E. LAW ENFORCEMENT SOCMINT USE 
LEAs are embracing the SOCMINT capability, which signals viability and 
provides opportunities for partnering and sharing best practices. State, local, federal, and 
international LEAs are using social media to identify potential terrorists. The 2016 
Annual Social Media Survey by the International Association of Chiefs of Police reports 
that 70 percent of the 539 agencies responding use social media for intelligence 
gathering.215 In 2016, the White House sent representatives to meet with Silicon Valley 
executives about social media vetting.216 The Department of Defense (DoD) created 
Information Volume and Velocity, which scrapes social media, identifies trends, and 
provides troops with real-time information.217 SocioSpyder harvests and stores social 
media posts, maps connections between users, and identifies possible targets for FBI 
investigation.218 The Central Intelligence Agency’s Open Source Enterprise gathers and 
analyzes social media content.219 In 2018, the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular 
Affairs announced its intent to review social media data as a part of the vetting process 
for visas.220 USCIS is not the only DHS component with an interest in this capability. 
The Secret Service requested funding in 2016 to increase its monitoring of social media 
during the presidential election campaign.221 In 2017, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement explored social media vetting at its extreme vetting industry day to enhance 
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its capabilities.222 The National Fusion Center Association, with federal support, is 
managing an effort to share Real-time Open Source Analysis of Social Media 
(ROSM).223 Andrew Parker, the Director-general of MI5, Britain’s intelligence service, 
said, “Information gathered from the technology terrorists use, often in the same way as 
the rest of us, may sometimes be the only way to stop them. We use data to save 
lives.”224 A diverse cross section of LEAs is leveraging SOCMINT in the fight against 
terrorism. FDNS’ desire to deploy SOCMINT aligns with other agencies’ efforts and may 
provide opportunities for sharing SOCMINT tradecraft.  
F. SOCMINT SUCCESSES 
The previously articulated value propositions have transcended the theoretical and 
translated into real-word terrorism intervention successes based on SOCMINT. While 
critics have questioned the efficacy of using open-source SOCMINT to stop terrorism, 
proponents of the method have achieved results for years. Since 2012, shipping 
companies have used Twitter and Facebook posts by al-Shabaab affiliated Somali pirates 
to comprehend better how criminals target ships and plan their attacks.225 In 2015, a 
geotagged social media post by an enemy fighter alerted the U.S. Air Force and led to the 
bombing of an Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant headquarters building.226 Suspects’ 
publicly bragging of their plans before acting upon them has been a helpful roadmap of 
radicalization and benefit for LEAs.227 Suspects’ radicalizing in real-time and in plain 
sight on social media has led to FBI arrests related to the Islamic State.228 According to 
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Public Security Minister Gilad Erdan in 2018, Israeli authorities have used SOCMINT to 
thwart over 200 Palestinian terror attacks.229 These examples are just a few that 
unequivocally support the claim that SOCMINT has progressed from theory to successful 
practice. SOCMINT’s success in identifying and mitigating threats will strengthen 
FDNS’ efforts to secure the homeland.  
G. CONCLUSION 
Deploying a SOCMINT capability will play a vital role in USCIS’ obligation to 
secure the homeland. A review of USCIS’ objectives, the terrorism-social media nexus, 
and SOCMINT’s viability validate this claim. Core to USCIS’ mission is protecting the 
homeland from fraud, public safety, and/or national security threats in the context of 
those seeking immigration benefits. USCIS has the legal authority to use SOCMINT in 
support of this mission. Evidence demonstrates that terrorists use social media in a 
variety of ways to achieve their nefarious ends, but the security experts identify 
opportunities for intervention. Research on radicalized immigrants’ interaction with 
social media and the internet demonstrates that this intervention is not only plausible in 
the immigration benefit context, but necessary. Open-source SOCMINT is capable of 
meeting this imperative. The variety of LEAs’ SOCMINT initiatives and their successes 
demonstrate this capability. These factors are strong propositions for SOCMINT. The 
next three chapters explore the arguments against USCIS’ use of SOCMINT, and 
whether and to what extent they should be of concern.  
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III. SOCMINT PROBLEMATIC EFFORT AND NECESSITY 
CONCERNS 
I think this puts the lie to the idea that wide-scale automated social media 
analysis is useful.  
—Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Senior Counsel, 
Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice 
 
 
We don’t know what they are looking for. And they don’t seem to know 
either.  
—Manar Waheed, Legislative and Advocacy Counsel, 
American Civil Liberties Union 
 
 
This chapter introduces the issue rhetoric as objections from those in the first 
camp of critics in the literature review. Despite the propositions for SOCMINT, critics 
assert the initiative will not assist USCIS in accomplishing its mission of securing the 
homeland. These critics put forth a series of objections that call into question the 
sensibility of USCIS efforts. First, those who argue against it allege the efforts to deploy 
a SOCMINT capability to date have been fraught with problems. Second, they contend 
that the program is unnecessary because the United States is safe enough. The merit of 
these claims potentially challenges the propriety of the propositions for SOCMINT. 
These arguments are two of the concerns that form the basis for the critics’ larger 
collective claim that SOCMINT will undermine the USCIS mission.  
Wells warns of the adverse effect on the public perceptions of SOCMINT 
initiatives when the subjective narratives are not addressed.230 Ignoring the opposing 
narratives and failing to engage the grievances and misconceptions fosters a lack of 
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public clarity.231 Collectively, the critics’ opposing narratives flourish unchecked in an 
echo chamber of sorts. They reciprocally quote each other’s staff across the various 
articles they produce. The bulk of the critics’ arguments and evidence is based on 
references (direct quotes and cited paraphrases) to the OIG and FOIA-released 
documents, and their own other articles. Best and Cummings, however, warn of how the 
repetition from an echo effect can imbue a narrative with more importance and credibility 
than is warranted.232  
Some critics admonish DHS for failing to give a full picture and pledge to fill that 
alleged gap.233 However, the critics often cherry-pick selective report comments and 
ignore context. For example, the OIG report contains two parts—the OIG’s findings and 
DHS’ response. The critics wholesale ignore DHS’ response in their articles. Their 
oversights often directly contradict or undermine their arguments. Hence, much of this 
chapter focusses on the explicit text of the OIG and FOIA-released documents.  
This chapter seeks to address the first two subjective narratives that oppose 
SOCMINT by interjecting a new voice in the echo chamber. A voice that hones in on the 
OIG report’s explicit language to provide a deeper account of both sides—the OIG’s and 
DHS’—and looks broadly across the full context of the FOIA-released documents. Those 
documents contain more information than the critics represent. This deeper and broader 
review demonstrates that SOCMINT will assist USCIS in accomplishing its mission of 
securing the homeland. The following rebuttals provide insights into the first two of the 
critics’ series of objections that attempt to call into question the sensibility of USCIS 
SOCMINT efforts. First, the critics’ allegation that the efforts to deploy a SOCMINT 
capability to date have been fraught with problems is unconvincing. Second, the 
contention that the program is unnecessary because the United States is safe enough is 
debatable. The claims fail to challenge the propriety of the propositions for SOCMINT. 
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Collectively, these objections fail to form a convincing basis for the critics’ larger claim 
that SOCMINT will not assist with USCIS’ mission.  
A. A PROBLEMATIC EFFORT 
Those who do not support this concept allege that the efforts to deploy a 
SOCMINT capability to date have been fraught with problems. Due to the non-public 
nature of government activities, documents produced from FOIA requests are often 
proffered in assessing government programs. The critics offer excerpts from the DHS 
OIG 2017 report and FOIA-released documents to demonstrate that USCIS’ SOCMINT 
initiative is problematic. They argue that the extent of any problems encountered thus far 
in creating a SOCMINT capability foreshadows the future success of the endeavor. 
Absent evidence to the contrary regarding problems, the critics’ claims paint a troubled 
picture of the SOCMINT efforts to date. 
1. Office of the Inspector General Report 
The critics contend that the OIG’s report demonstrates that USCIS has 
encountered problems in its attempts to deploy SOCMINT. Those who argue against it 
seize upon select comments from the OIG as proof that problems plague the SOCMINT 
undertaking. Failing to establish appropriate policies, procedures, and metrics capable of 
objectively assessing the efforts and outcomes of the SOCMINT program may adversely 
affect program operations. If the critics’ assessments are reasonable, they indicate that 
SOCMINT is a problematic initiative for USCIS.  
Patel et al.’s belief that the prior SOCMINT pilot programs are an inadequate 
basis to expand the effort is unconvincing.234 The authors’ conclusion tracks with the 
OIG’s report findings. The OIG based its “need increased rigor to ensure scalability and 
long-term success” conclusion on DHS’ alleged failure to adhere to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) “best practices for an effective pilot phase of a 
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program.”235 However, there is a problem—DHS did not in fact conduct any social 
media screening “pilots.”  
Word choice matters, especially when a word such as pilot is a term of art. Pilots 
give the evaluator an opportunity to assess feasibility formally and refine the design 
before full-scale execution.236 Pilots are a means to try the innovation in real time and 
make sure that everything works for preparation to scale up to full production.237 
Gardner clarifies that pilots are not research experiments or proof points that capabilities 
can be made to work.238 DHS made a critical word choice error by labeling its 
exploratory social media screening research activities as pilots. In addition, some 
personnel in DHS perpetuated that error by continuing, at times, to use the word “pilots” 
to describe DHS’ initial SOCMINT effort.  
DHS recognized its error, albeit after the OIG’s investigation. Taylor, the Under 
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence Officer, Counterterrorism 
Coordinator, and Co-Chair of the DHS SMTF, explained DHS’ error to the Inspector 
General after the OIG released its draft report. According to Taylor, DHS’ pilots were not 
pilots, but instead were “research and development projects, referred to as ‘pilots,’ to 
assess the feasibility of developing such a capability.”239 Taylor clarified that “DHS 
chose to pursue these research projects and did not initiate fully operational pilots, as 
defined by the GAO, because the technology capable of processing DHS’ screening 
mission sets in a scalable manner was not yet available for such an endeavor to have been 
successful.”240 The DHS’ efforts “were designed to assess tool performance and advance 
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the technical capabilities for large-scale, automated social media screening,” not to serve 
as pilots amenable to assessing program efficacy.241 This tool assessment approach 
aligns with conventional wisdom from the experts.242  
The DHS word choice error had far-reaching consequences. The DHS’ 
mislabeling of the research and development projects as pilots and the OIG’s subsequent 
investigation erroneously evaluating them using pilot assessment standards resulted in the 
conclusion that activities that were not pilots had not performed adequately as pilots. The 
critics rely on the OIG findings to inform their arguments about SOCMINT’s viability. 
Patel et al.’s conclusion that the prior SOCMINT pilot programs are an inadequate basis 
to expand DHS’ SOCMINT efforts, however, is unsupported. The OIG’s mistaken 
conclusion actually undermines Patel et al.’s belief that prior SOCMINT pilot programs 
are an inadequate basis to expand.  
Patel et al. also allege, “DHS has made no effort to evaluate [the pilots’] 
effectiveness.”243 This allegation, however, is problematic on three facets: a misplaced 
reliance, a flawed presumption, and omission of material facts. First, Patel et al.’s 
allegation relies on the OIG’s misleading pilot findings. The GAO explains that the pilot 
phase allows for an inquiry on whether “program operations” function as expected.244 
However, for the reasons previously explained, DHS’ efforts had not advanced to an 
operational program. It is illogical to insist that non-pilot activities—research and 
development projects—satisfy GAO pilot attributes and contain performance measuring 
criteria. These benchmark criteria are more appropriate when testing a near deployment-
ready capability in a pilot phase, not an exploratory discovery and sense making research 
endeavor.  
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Second, Patel et al.’s allegation that “DHS has [emphasis added] made no effort 
to evaluate their [the pilots] effectiveness” is presumptuous.245 The authors make this 
May 2019 pronouncement relying on an OIG investigation that concluded in October 
2016, over two and half years prior. Patel et al.’s present day allegation ignores all the 
DHS activities since October 2016. A review of FOIA-released documents for one DHS 
component’s division supports a contradictory story. The FDNS’ Social Media Branch, 
which comprises approximately 20 full-time employees including IOs, supervisors, 
intelligence research specialists, and management and program analysts, operates at an 
annual cost of approximately $3,000,000.246 Nine FOIA-released reports relating to this 
division contain detailed, substantive references on “lessons learned,” “next steps,” 
“challenges,” “accomplishments,” and “milestones” of the SOCMINT initiative.247 
These references, before and after the OIG investigation, evince a long-standing, clear 
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pattern of efforts focused on evaluating and improving effectiveness of the use of 
SOCMINT.  
Lastly, Patel et al. fail to disclose three material facts regarding DHS’ efforts to 
measure effectiveness. The first relates to the methodology used in the OIG’s 
investigation. This methodology issue is separate from the aforementioned issue of 
assessing the research and development activities as de facto pilots. The OIG conducted 
its inspection between July and October 2016.248 The OIG inspection only references 
three pilots despite the fact that, as Taylor advises, DHS had actually conducted seven 
pilots.249 Consequently, the OIG’s report fails to consider over 57 percent of DHS’ 
SOCMINT activities. Patel et al.’s overlooking this fact insulates from scrutiny the OIG’s 
conclusions and the authors’ derivative conclusion regarding DHS efforts to measure 
effectiveness.  
The second material fact also relates to the OIG missing information. The OIG 
explicitly acknowledged that it did not include a key report in its analysis—The 
Homeland Security Systems Engineering & Development Institute (HSSEDI) report, 
Social Media Analytics Capability Testing: Independent Assessment.250 The report, 
which memorialized the feasibility testing of 275 social media tools, was rich with the 
type of evaluation “metrics” that the OIG repeatedly alleged were missing.251 The 
inspectors did not have the benefit of this report, which was finalized October 28, 2016, 
and not released to the OIG until January 6, 2017, subsequent to the close of the 
inspection period.252 However, the OIG noted:  
The assessment included seven steps in conducting evaluations for 
quantitative analysis: (1) define the purpose of the evaluation; (2) 
elaborate a task model; (3) define top-level quality characteristics; (4) 
produce system requirements; (5) define metrics to measure requirements; 
                                               
248 Roth, DHS’ Pilots for Social Media Screening, 9.  
249 Roth, 11.  
250 Roth, 8.  
251 Roth, 5–8, 11.  
252 Roth, 7.  
58 
(6) define techniques to measure metrics; and (7) carry out and interpret 
the evaluation.253  
The OIG acknowledged, “This framework was followed for the independent assessment 
and should be continued with testing pilots.”254 Patel et al.’s oversight of this fact shields 
from scrutiny the OIG’s conclusions and the authors’ derivative conclusion regarding 
DHS’ efforts to measure effectiveness.  
The third material fact relates to substantive content of the OIG report. As noted 
earlier, the report contains two sides—the OIG’s discussion and findings, and DHS’ 
comments to the draft report. Patel et al. only present the OIG’s side of the report. 
However, Taylor was unambiguous in his comments that DHS did use metrics to evaluate 
the effectiveness of its efforts properly.255 As support, Taylor provided clarity on 
feasibility testing and component metrics, the flow of performance measure information, 
and DHS’ next steps.  
Regarding testing and metrics, Taylor explained that the feasibility testing 
included a market survey to identify whether 275 tools met minimum capability 
requirements; evaluated tools that met key screening capability requirements; and 
completed an in-depth quantitative and qualitative evaluation of each tool’s 
capabilities.256 He explained, “DHS used and will continue to use a rigorous and 
repeatable qualitative and quantitative criteria for measuring tool performance” with 
various metrics identified in the HSSEDI assessment report. Taylor cited specific metrics:  
DHS components consistently collect and analyze a comprehensive 
collection of metrics to measure the performance of ongoing research and 
development pilots, including the (a) processing time per case, (b) number 
of queries conducted, (c) number of cases where relevant information was 
returned, (d) number of returned documents for each query, (e) number of 
social media accounts found, (f) number of documents collected, (g) 
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number of travel confirmations, and (h) number of Social Media 
Assessment reports written when information of interest is found.257  
Taylor also addressed how the allegedly missing performance evaluation 
information flowed across DHS. He explained, “[P]erformance measures such as project 
milestones are reported on a weekly basis to the Task Force using a Plan of Action and 
Milestones reporting function.”258 He described how the “Task Force’s activities and 
pilots’ performance are memorialized in a weekly agenda, discussed in a weekly 
conference call with Task Force members, and disseminated to the Task Force and DHS 
leadership in weekly summaries.”259  
To address the OIG’s concerns about alleged missing metrics, Taylor outlined 
DHS’ path forward. Taylor said, “DHS will also increase its efforts to improve the 
transparency and appropriate socialization of metrics used by Components by attaching 
them to the Task Force’s weekly conference call readouts.”260 He also explained that as 
the research and development efforts matured to an operational capability, DHS would 
identify “true benchmarks for future operational pilots’ success.”261 Patel et al.’s 
oversight of this fact protects the OIG’s conclusions and the authors’ derivative 
conclusion regarding DHS’ efforts to measure effectiveness from thoughtful, balanced 
analysis.  
Patel et al.’s contention that SOCMINT is problematic because the pilots lacked 
policies and procedures also is misleading.262 The authors support this claim by citing 
the OIG’s findings that none existed.263 It is reasonable to expect that pilots have policies 
and procedures. However, as explained previously, these exploratory social media 
screening research and development activities were not yet intended to be pilots, let alone 
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an operational capability. Taylor responded to the OIG’s concern, “When the Task Force 
was established, neither clearly defined processes, nor robust technical capabilities for 
large-scale, automated social media screening existed in industry or within the 
Government.”264 On March 16, 2016, approximately four months before the OIG 
initiated its investigation, USCIS acknowledged it did “not have any experience in using 
it [social media] as a large scale screening tool” and “therefore decided to approach this 
work as an open-ended exploration with very flexible research parameters.”265 
Internally, USCIS researchers characterized the program as “an adaptive learning 
approach,” not a deployment-ready capability that would need policies and procedures 
yet.266 Identifying potentially workable processes was in constant flux. The team used an 
“adaptive approach to create, implement, and continually revise its social media 
screening procedures.”267 Such a flexible and creative approach is typical in this 
space.268 The effort had yet to mature from research and development into a process 
amenable to creating policies and procedures before the OIG’s investigation occurred. 
This future capability, once the SMTF transitioned its research and development efforts 
into a functional capability, was slated to reside at the DHS Social Media Center of 
Excellence (COE).269 The OIG acknowledged, “We reviewed the task force’s concept of 
operations for the role of the COE, but could not evaluate the COE at this time because it 
has not been set up or funded.”270 In short, the OIG’s 2016 investigation into DHS’ 
SOCMINT efforts was premature.  
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2. USCIS FOIA Documents 
The critics contend that admissions in internal reports demonstrate that USCIS 
has encountered problems in its attempts to deploy SOCMINT. Those who do not support 
this concept offer these revelations as primary source proof that SOCMINT is 
problematic. The FOIA-released findings reported internally within USCIS reveal 
critical, unknown insights into the viability of SOCMINT. Sans an alternative to the 
critics’ explanation regarding USCIS’ judgments, these claims lend support to the notion 
that SOCMINT is a problematic endeavor.  
Patel et al.’s allegation that USCIS “explicitly questioned the overall value of the 
programs” is erroneous.271 In support of this claim, the authors seize on and isolate a 
sentence in a FOIA-released document, “Having FDNS personnel dedicated to mass 
social media screening diverts them away from conducting the more targeted enhanced 
vetting they are well trained and equipped to do.”272 Analyzing this sentence in context 
by examining the adjacent sentences reveals that USCIS is not questioning the value of 
the program. Conversely, USCIS is identifying challenges, finding solutions, and forging 
ahead.  
The sentence that the critics seize on exists in a FOIA-released report that also 
says, “There are several technical challenges to semi-automated use and access of social 
media that DHS is working to overcome.”273 The report clarifies, “USCIS is working 
now on developing greater social media vetting capability on that kind of case-by-case 
referral basis.”274 The report continues, “Future milestones related to Social Media 
include: FDNS will continue a risk-based expansion of social media screening 
[redacted]....”275 Elsewhere in the director’s presidential transition team documents, 
USCIS states that as social media screening tools and processes are developed and made 
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available through the COE, “USCIS will increasingly turn to the COE to assist USCIS in 
its social media vetting of immigration applicants.”276  
The sentence in question should be read in context to appreciate its true meaning. 
In addition, the sentence could arguably indicate that social media screening is straining 
staffing levels and therefore the division needed more social media screening personnel. 
The fact that the Social Media Division (SMD) began actively hiring additional personnel 
less than six months after this report supports this interpretation.277 Other FOIA-released 
documents support this time and labor intensive staffing interpretation.278 A broader 
contextual analysis contradicts the allegation that USCIS is questioning the overall value 
of SOCMINT.  
Patel et al.’s claim that “USCIS itself found that social media monitoring was not 
particularly helpful when it tested social media vetting for five programs” is false.279 
Patel et al. seize on a sentence in a FOIA-released document. The sentence in question 
begins, “In a small number of cases, information discovered through social media 
screening had limited impact on the processing of those cases.”280 Patel et al. mistakenly 
declare this sentence is evidence that USCIS more broadly discovered “that social media 
monitoring was not particularly helpful.”281  
Nowhere in the report does USCIS actually say, “that social media monitoring 
was not particularly helpful.”282 Conversely, three sentences after the sentence that Patel 
et al. rely on, USCIS says it “may be helpful in developing additional lines of inquiry 
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when adjudicating the benefit request.”283 USCIS partner S&T continues its efforts to 
enhance SOCMINT tools, as confirmed by a solicitation articulated in Long Range Broad 
Agency Announcement (LRBAA) 18–01, which was released June 4, 2018.284 In addition, 
the Science and Technology Directorate Budget Overview: Fiscal Year 2019 
Congressional Justification indicates, “Social Media tools [are] the current major 
investment area” under the Data Analytics Engine.285 It appears that social media 
analytics falls under a number of initiatives and that S&T budgeted $5–10 million for 
fiscal year (FY) 2019.286 USCIS’ collective comments, its confidence in S&T, and 
S&T’s agenda and budgeting indicate USCIS sees benefits in using SOCMINT.  
B. WE ARE SAFE ENOUGH 
The critics claim that the United States is safe enough without SOCMINT. They 
advance several explanations to support this assertion. The objections are grounded in 
different rational. However, these objections stand for the proposition that SOCMINT is 
unnecessary. Without evidence dispelling the safe enough theory, the necessity for 
SOCMINT wanes.  
Bier’s argument that vetting failures are infrequent, especially after 9/11 is true, 
but does not mean that the United States is safe enough.287 He provides a detailed 
numerical analysis of historical vetting failures.288 Bier argues, “[T]he country has 
maxed out its capacity to improve immigration vetting.”289 Assuming the status quo 
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vetting procedures make this nation safe enough, though, dangerously ignores three 
critical considerations.  
First, the 9/11 Commission concluded, “The 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of 
failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.”290 Deciding the 
sufficiency of current vetting procedures on a historical analysis binds the analysis to the 
past and guarantees a failure of imagination regarding future possibilities. This practice 
has proven especially dangerous in immigration matters. The Commission determined, 
“Both Hazmi and Mihdhar could have been held for immigration violations.”291 The 
Commission concluded, “Investigation or interrogation of them, and investigation of their 
travel and financial activities, could have yielded evidence of connections to other 
participants in the 9/11 plot.”292  
Second, experts have warned of relying on statistical analysis of historic events 
after 9/11. RAND concludes, “[T]errorist events occurred in clusters in the period 
between 1970 and 2002; after that, the distribution of events is statistically random.”293 
Bier provides a thorough numerical analysis, e.g., “[T]he rate for deadly terrorists was 1 
for every 379 million visa or status approvals from 2002 through 2016.”294 However, 
RAND demonstrates:  
[A]nalysis of the historical record of terrorism highlights an observation 
that is both obvious and salient to security planning: Current assessments 
of terrorism are driven not by what terrorists have done since 9/11, but 
rather by what terrorists might do in the future—replicate a 9/11-scale 
attack or worse using weapons of mass destruction.295  
Bier’s detailed numerical analysis ignores RAND’s central conclusion.  
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Third, Bier’s arguments assume stasis—that threats and the success of mitigating 
them do not change. However, front-line practitioners contradict analysts’ speculation. 
McChrystal urges that the modern terrorism threat is a new kind of threat, bred by a 
fundamentally new kind of environment spawned from technological and social 
changes.296 Bier’s alleged sufficient, maxed out vetting theory is analogous to the 
Maginot Line that proved so ineffective for France in World War II.297 As inevitable 
changes flourish, today’s sufficiency becomes tomorrow’s insufficiency.  
Inserra’s theory that we “must not shift resources from countering” homegrown 
terrorist threats “in order to start broad social media vetting efforts” in the absence of 
attacks from abroad is debatable.298 He argues, “Since start 2015, all 30 Islamist plots 
and attacks against the U.S. homeland have involved a homegrown terrorist.”299 
Therefore, he says, we should not begin broad social media vetting efforts for individuals 
from abroad.300 Like Bier, he assumes the past equals the future in terms of threats.  
Sagarin claims the answer to security threats lies in understanding nature, not 
historical trends in attacks.301 Sagarin contends that nature can be a framework for 
dealing with security problems that require adaptability.302 Sagarin bases this claim on 
the idea that “biological organisms and human societies both face highly variable and 
highly unpredictable threats.”303 His central argument is that “no effective security 
solution can be deployed and not modified or changed with time, because everything 
around it will be changing.”304 Sagarin concurs with McChrystal that Maginot Line 
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strategies are unable to solve emerging, contemporary threats.305 Inserra’s theory ignores 
the potential for change. His objection to SOCMINT based on it not being necessary in 
light of current trends in attacks is unpersuasive.  
Patel et al.’s challenge to the notion that value exists in focusing resources on this 
initiative based on a low hit rate is deceptive.306 Patel et al. cite a report in a FOIA-
released document that social media screening had a “limited” impact in “a small number 
of cases.”307 This report is only inclusive of results through November 4, 2016.308 More 
important is what the report represents: information from a mere five research and 
development projects.309 These projects did not comprise a fully deployed operational 
capability, but rather the first steps into a nascent space where “neither clearly defined 
processes, nor robust technical capabilities for large-scale, automated social media 
screening existed in industry or within the Government.”310 The researchers were just 
discovering what needed to be done, whether it could be done, how to do it, and what 
tools might do it best. For Quentin et al., this type of discovery is a crucial step.311 A 
meaningful assessment of value regarding a future operational SOCMINT capability 
should only rely on that program’s merits. Consequently, relying on the hit rate from a 
newly ventured learning curve involving a handful of research and development projects 
to be somehow indicative “of the value of focusing resources on collecting and analyzing 
this type of data” is not very logical.312  
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C. CONCLUSION 
The arguments offered by the critics fail to support their position. SOCMINT is a 
plausible initiative to leverage in attempting to protect the homeland because the efforts 
to date have not been problematic. Moreover, misplaced reliance on the nation’s current 
degree of safety reinforces the need for such a program. In sum, the legitimacy of the 
claims by those who do not support this concept due to SOCMINT’s alleged problematic 
nature and non-necessity falters. In other words, the critics’ arguments do not withstand 
scrutiny. The propositions for SOCMINT as a means to secure the homeland in this 
context are valid. The next chapter explores the critics’ objections based on efficacy.  
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IV. SOCMINT EFFICACY CONCERNS 
Al Qaeda is executing a time-tested strategy, and its members are doing it 
by the book. Plus it is much easier now, as the Internet has made 
communication simple and instantaneous and formal organization all but 
unnecessary. Terrorists groups of all kinds now use this technology to its 
fullest capability. Today’s terrorists can recruit, indoctrinate, and 
communicate without even meeting each other. Terrorism has become an 
Information Age threat, but our intelligence agencies still examine it 
through an Industrial Age lens.  
—Mike German, author, 
Thinking Like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent 
 
 
‘Open source’ was ‘frosting on the cake’ of source material dominated by 
clandestine collection, SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT. Today, open 
source has expanded well beyond ‘frosting’ deep into the cake. It is 
indispensable to the production of authoritative analysis.  
 —John C. Gannon, former Chairman, 
National Intelligence Council 
 
 
This chapter analyzes the efficacy issues identified by the second camp of critics 
in the literature review. Those who argue against SOCMINT assert that it is ineffective at 
identifying and mitigating threats. The critics identify an assortment of issues that call 
into question the efficacy of SOCMINT, including yield, scope, scale, language, context, 
encryption, and identity resolution challenges. A viable SOCMINT capability must be 
adept at traversing the complex terrain of challenges this environment presents. If the 
critics’ claims regarding USCIS’ inability to overcome these issues are true, the claims 
strongly contradict the purported efficacy of SOCMINT.  
A. YIELD 
The critics contend that SOCMINT is incapable of yielding useful information on 
threats. As evidence, the critics point to the results from several SOCMINT pilots. The 
inability of a SOCMINT program to identify and mitigate threats essentially renders it 
70 
useless. If the critics’ assessment of the threat identification and mitigation ability is 
meritorious, it supports that SOCMINT is ineffective.  
Patel et al.’s allegation that the DHS SOCMINT pilots have been “notably 
unsuccessful in identifying threats to national security” is misleading.313 The authors go 
as far as to say, “Even more damning are USCIS’ own evaluations.”314 In support of this 
claim, the authors cite a statement from an internal report, “[T]he information in the 
accounts did not yield clear, articulable links to national security concerns, even for those 
applicants who were found to pose a potential national security threat based on other 
security screening results.”315  
This statement may not be a reliable assessment of whether SOCMINT is 
beneficial in identifying national security threats for four reasons. First, this statement 
was made in December 2016 based on only three of the initial research and development 
projects that were concluded by December 2015.316 The projects only involved refugees, 
which is a subset of the different types of immigration benefit requests that USCIS vets. 
Therefore, drawing conclusions about a future capability that will involve all benefit 
request types based on initial research and development projects confined to only refugee 
cases may be unreliable. Second, available information revealed SOCMINT use in 235 
cases. USCIS adjudicates more than 26,000 applications and petitions for a variety of 
immigration benefits on an average day.317 Therefore, relying on initial research and 
development project data from such a small sample size of cases may not be a reliable 
basis to draw conclusions about a future capability. Third, the authors fail to disclose 
language indicating, “FDNS encountered a number of challenges, limitations, and 
inefficiencies with the [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)] tool and 
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concluded that it did not meet USCIS needs for social media screening.”318 Therefore, 
drawing conclusions about a future capability still in development based on results 
involving a specific DARPA tool that will not be used by USCIS in the future carries no 
weight. Fourth, USCIS was transparent about its unfamiliarity with SOCMINT when it 
embarked on this endeavor.319 Failing to identify threats that were confirmed outside of 
social media in initial research and development projects does not mean that a future 
SOCMINT capability still in development will not be successful at identifying threats. As 
optimal tools are discovered and experience improves tradecraft, the success of detection 
may improve.  
The ACLU argument that there is “no reason to believe collecting and retaining 
this kind of social media information will improve our security” lacks merit.320 Security 
experts’ opinions, LEAs’ use of and their successes with SOCMINT, and PIRUS research 
do provide multiple reasons to believe that SOCMINT will improve the nation’s security. 
The Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States subsection in Chapter II 
supports the notion that terrorists who are immigrants use social media and an 
opportunity exists to intervene. The Experts subsection in Chapter II concludes that the 
security experts agree about the viability of using SOCMINT to identify terrorists. The 
Law Enforcement SOCMINT Use section in Chapter II concludes that LEAs are 
embracing the SOCMINT capability, which signals viability. The SOCMINT Successes 
section in Chapter II demonstrates that real-word terrorism intervention successes have 
resulted based on SOCMINT. Collectively, substantial support does exist that SOCMINT 
can improve security. The ACLU’s argument about the absence of reasons to believe 
SOCMINT will improve security does not withstand scrutiny.  
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B. SCOPE AND SCALE 
Those opposing the SOCMINT initiative maintain that the number of platforms 
and volume of posts inhibit adept identification of threats. These opponents recognize the 
complexity of this domain and do not see technology as a silver bullet. Over 100 English-
language social networks are in existence.321 Twitter users post 500 million tweets every 
day.322 Users on Facebook share almost five billion pieces of content every day.323 
YouTube users upload over 18,000 hours of video every hour.324 The enormous quantity 
of user content posted to these websites creates a challenge in identifying terrorism 
content.325 An effective SOCMINT capability must be capable of sorting signals from 
noise in vast amounts of data, especially when millions of immigration benefits are 
sought annually. Unless the claim about successfully managing social media post volume 
is disproved, the efficacy of SOCMINT is suspect.  
Patel et al.’s contention that automating the SOCMINT process to review 
enormous volumes of social media posts compounds the difficulty of correctly 
interpreting SOCMINT data is misplaced.326 The vast number of social media platforms 
(scope) and the enormous quantity of social media posts (scale) may create an 
opportunity for automated technologies to improve processing efficiency that may be in 
tension with accuracy. However, any concerns about potential problems associated with 
automating SOCMINT to review enormous volumes of social media data are irrelevant if 
USCIS’ process of reviewing posts is not in fact automated. The USCIS “Social Media” 
issue paper in the December 6, 2016, Briefing Book materials for the presidential 
transition team explicitly acknowledges the technical challenges with semi-automated use 
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and access of social media.327 The “USCIS Social Media & Vetting: Overview and 
Efforts to Date” report updated on March 2, 2017, unequivocally states, “all social media 
screening and vetting requires a manual review of information.”328 USCIS’ research and 
development projects revealed challenges associated with using semi-automated and 
automated screening of social media data.329 Consequently, the SMD’s current 
SOCMINT capability does not rely on the alleged non-manual review methods for social 
media posts. Patel et al.’s automation argument is inapt because USCIS is not relying on 
automated SOCMINT for the process of reviewing posts.  
C. LANGUAGE 
According to the critics, language presents an insurmountable hurdle for 
proficient threat identification. They question technology’s ability to overcome 
interpretation challenges; language challenges are different from context challenges, 
which are addressed in a different section that follows. A viable SOCMINT program 
must be capable of processing a diverse mix of different languages to identify threats. If 
the critics are correct, this contention about interpreting language lends support to the 
argument that SOCMINT is not effective.  
Patel et al.’s argument that SOCMINT will require that government agencies have 
the ability to understand over 7,000 languages and the cultural norms of 193 countries to 
avoid misinterpretation issues is misleading.330 Language and culture do make 
discerning meaning from social media data difficult. This challenge is typical to 
intelligence processing and analysis in general, not just SOCMINT.331 However, 
safeguards are in place to mitigate misinterpretation and any potential derivative adverse 
outcomes. The initial research and development projects’ reports indicate that USCIS 
rejected social media tools that “did not offer an option to flag cases/accounts/social 
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media posts for linguist review.”332 The “USCIS Social Media & Vetting: Overview and 
Efforts to Date” report reveals that multiple entities are being engaged to assist with 
expert translation.333 USCIS also utilizes “subject matter expertise in regional culture, 
religion, and terrorism.”334 Beyond seeking expert support, USCIS has implemented 
additional safeguards. First, “FDNS incorporates strenuous verification procedures to 
ensure accuracy of data before an immigration benefit decision is made by 
adjudications.”335 Second, “As with all derogatory information found from publicly 
available sources, the applicant and/or petitioner must be provided with an appropriate 
opportunity to explain or refute any information that conflicts with information he or she 
provided to USCIS before a decision is made regarding the requested benefit.”336 And 
third:  
All information obtained by FDNS IOs and reviewed by ISOs is reviewed 
in accordance with a strict set of internal procedures intended to ensure 
that actionable derogatory information meets the standards for evidence 
established by the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office, the Department 
of Justice (DOJ), Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), and 
the federal court system.337  
These safeguard efforts exist to mitigate the potential of misinterpretation of language or 
cultural norms adversely affecting immigration benefit adjudication. USCIS’ approach to 
SOCMINT evidence aligns with what the experts recommend.338 Patel et al.’s concerns 
have not gone unaddressed.  
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EPIC’s contention that SOCMINT potentially causes irreversible harm based on 
language translation failures is unpersuasive.339 EPIC provides an example of a 
Facebook algorithm erroneously machine translating the Arabic post “good morning” 
into “attack them” and “hurt them.”340 EPIC only tells part of this story, however. EPIC 
neglects to disclose that the mishap occurred because the Israeli police failed to consult 
an Arabic speaker to confirm the machine translation prior to making an arrest.341 As 
noted previously, USCIS does not exclusively rely on machine translation without expert 
linguist consultation.342 Second, the previously identified safeguards—data accuracy 
verification procedures, the opportunity to explain or refute, and sound evidentiary 
standards—protect against the misinterpretation risk.343 EPIC’s argument about this 
potential for irreversible harm is unconvincing based on how USCIS manages its 
SOCMINT program. 
Patel et al.’s contention “that 20–30 percent of posts analyzed through natural 
language processing would be misinterpreted” is unpersuasive.344 The authors proffer 
accuracy limitations associated with natural language processing; however, the authors 
ignore several key considerations. First, this argument assumes that natural language 
processing outcomes are dispositive, e.g., evaluative efforts stop after natural language 
processing occurs and that decisions are based solely on the outcome of the natural 
language processing. The argument ignores that supplemented review by human analysts 
can increase accuracy rates above the 70–80 percent level achieved by machine-only 
processing. In addition, USCIS reports make clear that an officer must manually review 
the content of social media data to identify if any derogatory indicators are present.345 
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Second, the argument is only relevant if USCIS deploys and solely relies on natural 
language processing technologies. Again, USCIS says, “all social media screening and 
vetting requires a manual review of information.”346 This manual review by human 
analysts helps mitigate misinterpretation. Third, the argument ignores that safeguards 
exist to protect against misinterpretation. The previously identified safeguards—data 
accuracy verification procedures, the opportunity to explain or refute, and sound 
evidentiary standards—hedge against the misinterpretation risk.347 Patel et al.’s 
argument about natural language processing accuracy limitations is unpersuasive based 
on how USCIS conducts SOCMINT.  
Patel et al.’s claim that sentiment analysis is even less accurate is 
unpersuasive.348 The argument is only relevant if USCIS is deploying sentiment analysis 
technologies. Nothing in public records, however, supports that USCIS is using sentiment 
analysis. The authors cite an article that discusses comments by an official in an unrelated 
DHS component and the availability of sentiment analysis in the DoD’s DARPA tool that 
USCIS tested during research and development projects.349 However, USCIS concluded 
that the DARPA tool did not meet USCIS’ needs for social media screening.350 Patel et 
al.’s argument about sentiment analysis accuracy limitations is unconvincing in light of 
how USCIS conducts SOCMINT.  
D. CONTEXT 
The critics argue that attempts at accurate sense making, amid ambiguous context, 
confound SOCMINT analysts. Those who argue against SOCMINT identify problems 
that context presents to SOCMINT analysts. Failing to understand a social media post’s 
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context properly can frustrate accurate threat identification and potentially lead to 
incorrect understanding. If insurmountable, the understanding context dilemma detracts 
from SOCMINT’s efficacy.  
Patel et al.’s argument that misinterpretation problems based on context plague 
efforts to make judgments using SOCMINT is unconvincing.351 The authors offer a 
hypothetical example that purports to present the analyst with ambiguity in determining 
meaning when a user “loves” an ISIS-related social media post.352 The authors’ claim 
ignores USCIS’ procedures for addressing content that may result in misinterpretations 
based on context. Some of the same DHS safeguards deployed to address language 
misinterpretation issues are used to mitigate context misinterpretation issues. USCIS 
documentation reports, “Due to its inherent lack of data integrity, public source 
information is not used as the sole basis upon which to deny an immigration benefit, 
investigate benefit fraud, or identify public safety and national security concerns.”353 
Potentially derogatory information identified in social media checks that relates to an 
individual “may be helpful in developing additional lines of inquiry when adjudicating 
the benefit request.”354 USCIS’ line of inquiry approach is consistent with the experts’ 
guidance.355 USCIS gives applicants and/or petitioners an appropriate opportunity to 
explain or refute any information.356 The caution observed, manner of use, and 
validation of social media data resolves concerns about making accurate judgments of 
SOCMINT data. USCIS’ approach to verification and validation aligns with the experts’ 
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guidance.357 Patel et al.’s claim regarding misinterpretations based on context ambiguity 
fails when considering how USCIS makes judgments using SOCMINT data.  
The EPIC argument that SOCMINT is unreliable because “making decisions 
based on social media data is complex” in light of context challenges is shortsighted.358 
EPIC supports this claim based on the allegation, “The current systems can’t 
automatically compute risks of terrorist behavior.”359 Citing Cohen’s article, EPIC 
argues that relying on keywords out of context frustrates accurate identification of 
terrorist behavior.360 However, this claim ignores the facts regarding SOCMINT’s role in 
USCIS adjudicative decisions. USCIS reports confirm, “[a]s of November 4, 2016, no 
immigration benefits have been denied solely or primarily because of information 
uncovered through social media vetting.”361 USCIS is not attempting to compute the 
risks of terrorist behavior based on keyword occurrences. Any potentially derogatory 
social media information merely opens a line of inquiry regarding terrorist concerns. 
EPIC’s claim concerning SOCMINT unreliability fails to consider how USCIS actually 
uses SOCMINT data for adjudicative decisions.  
EPIC’s contention citing Lang, “One mistake can result in a wrongful denial of 
entry, arrest, and worse,” concerning the consequences of misinterpreting context is 
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misleading.362 USCIS does not deny immigration benefits solely based on 
SOCMINT.363 All information, including social media information, is evaluated “to 
ensure that actionable derogatory information meets the standards for evidence” 
discussed previously.364 These internal procedures are in place to ensure that the extreme 
outcomes that EPIC warns of may only result when adequately supported with reliable 
evidence. EPIC’s argument involving haphazard outcomes is contradicted by USCIS’ 
evidentiary standards practices.  
E. ENCRYPTION 
Those who argue against SOCMINT claim encryption options available to 
nefarious actors render open-source SOCMINT efforts moot. The critics see encryption 
as a countermeasure that eliminates the need for SOCMINT. USCIS’ open-source 
SOCMINT capability relies exclusively on the ability to access unencrypted social media 
data. If the critics’ assessment regarding encryption is meritorious, the argument for 
SOCMINT’s efficacy is severely weakened.  
The ACLU assertion that “[a]nyone actually engaged in terrorism will simply take 
additional steps to hide their communications, making this information collection 
ineffective” does not pass scrutiny.365 The PIRUS dataset contradicts this claim for both 
internet users and social media users. In Chapter II’s Operational Security subsection, the 
analysis focuses on radicalized immigrants for whom social media played a role in their 
radicalization and who took action on their plot. Here, the analysis expands beyond 
radicalized immigrants and social media to address the ACLU’s broader claim. The 
PIRUS variable “Internet_Use_Plot” contemplates if the “extremist activity involved a 
violent plot, did the individual use the internet for communications or logistics while 
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preparing for and undertaking the plot?”366 For example, “[U]sing the internet to 
communicate with group members or other extremists, threatening targets, researching 
the target and tactics, and ordering supplies.”367 Adjusting the group size of the 2,148 
radicalized to include only those subjects whose internet plot use was known and the plot 
occurred after 1995 reduces this group to 370 subjects.368 Isolating the 
“Internet_Use_Plot” variable identifies that 155 of the subjects (41.89 percent) used the 
internet in conjunction with their plot preparations.  
The “Op_Security” variable identifies, “If the individual’s first publically known 
extremist activity involved a violent plot, did the individual attempt to hide or conceal 
preparation for the plot?”369 The operational security efforts are known for 135 of the 
155 subjects who used the internet in conjunction with their plot preparations. Secondary 
research based on the “Op_Security” variable reveals that of the 135 internet plotters, 26 
subjects (19.26 percent) were “openly vocal about the plot (discussed it with friends and 
associates, procured suspicious supplies—like explosives or weapons—without being 
discrete, etc.).”370 The PIRUS data indicates that 45 of the 135 subjects (33.33 percent) 
were “neither covert nor overt (did not discuss the plot openly or overtly procure 
supplies, but also did not attempt to hide activities).”371 The data demonstrates that 
nearly 53 percent of the Internet_Use_Plot subjects did not make efforts to hide what they 
were doing.  
The “Social_Media” variable reports when there is “evidence that online social 
media played a role in the individual’s radicalization and/or mobilization.”372 Adjusting 
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for radicalization that occurred before 2005 and cases in which social media’s role in 
radicalization is unknown reduces the 2,148 radicalized to 608 subjects.373 Isolating the 
“Social_Media” variable identifies that social media “played a role but was not the 
primary means of radicalization or mobilization” in 295 of the 608 subjects (48.52 
percent).374 Analyzing the “Social_Media” variable reveals that social media “was the 
primary means of radicalization for the individual (e.g., initial exposure to ideology and 
subsequent radicalization occurred over online social media)” in 63 of the 608 subjects 
(10.36 percent).375 Social media played at least some role for 358, a majority (58.88 
percent) of the radicalized. The operational security efforts are known for 139 of the 358 
subjects who radicalized on social media. Secondary research based on the 
“Op_Security” variable reveals that of the 139 social media radicalized, 31 subjects 
(22.30 percent) were “openly vocal about the plot (discussed it with friends and 
associates, procured suspicious supplies—like explosives or weapons—without being 
discrete, etc.).”376 The PIRUS data indicates that 58 of the 139 subjects (41.73 percent) 
were “neither covert nor overt (did not discuss the plot openly or overtly procure 
supplies, but also did not attempt to hide activities).”377 The data demonstrates that 64 
percent of the Social_Media subjects did not make efforts to hide what they were doing. 
Research on the PIRUS dataset disproves the ACLU’s argument that SOCMINT is 
ineffective because operational security measures, e.g., using encryption, will prevent 
identifying terrorists. Moreover, Ramwell et al. argue that even when operational security 
is deployed, an activity trail is often exploitable.378  
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F. IDENTITY RESOLUTION 
Successful identity resolution, according to the SOCMINT critics, is illusory. 
They draw on the lessons learned regarding identity resolutions during USCIS’ initial 
SOCMINT efforts as proof that SOCMINT is ineffective. Merely identifying a potential 
threat on social media is of little value if authorities cannot correctly attribute that 
potential threat to a person amenable to investigation. Justifying the efficacy of 
SOCMINT will be difficult if the critics’ assessment concerning identity resolution is 
accurate.  
The assertion that a “key takeaway from the pilot programs was that they were 
unable to reliably match social media accounts to the individual being vetted” by Patel et 
al. is misleading.379 The authors base this claim on a discussion of challenges that DHS 
was working to overcome as identified in the “Social Media” issue paper in the 
December 6, 2016, Briefing Book materials for the presidential transition team.380 First, 
the identity resolution concern is not contained in the “Challenges” section of a 
subsequent March 2, 2017, report.381 Hence, perhaps DHS was successful at overcoming 
this challenge. Day et al. argue identity matching is not insurmountable.382 Second, 
maybe tradecraft improved and eliminated this challenge. For example, Karasek argues 
that immigration officials have an advantage in the SOCMINT terrorist discovery 
endeavor—immigration officials have relatively complete and reliable sets of personal 
data submitted by the applicants themselves.383 This reliable data can help resolve 
identities. The explanation for the absence of the identity resolution challenge in the latest 
publicly available report and the theory on tradecraft improvements are speculation. 
However, they are no more speculative than the assertion that the identity resolution 
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problem identified three years ago in research and development projects persists or 
remains to the same extent in the current deployed SOCMINT capability. Patel et al.’s 
claim about identity resolution is questionable.  
G. CONCLUSION 
The critics’ contention that yield, scope, scale, language, context, encryption, and 
identity resolution challenges render SOCMINT ineffective at identifying and mitigating 
threats is incorrect. Examining the facts in public records contradicts the position of those 
who do not support this concept. The critics’ characterization of automation, natural 
language processing, and sentiment analysis do not apply to USCIS’ SOCMINT 
program. USCIS safeguards—data accuracy verification procedures, the opportunity to 
explain or refute, and sound evidentiary standards—prevent the alleged misinterpretation 
risk. The position of those who argue against SOCMINT that efficacy challenges have 
created insurmountable obstacles for SOCMINT is unpersuasive. The next chapter 
addresses the data and constitutional concerns identified by those in the last camp who 
oppose SOCMINT.  
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V. SOCMINT DATA AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and [emphasis added] 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.  
—U.S. Constitution, Preamble 
 
 
The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with 
order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the [Supreme] 
Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it 
will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.  
—Justice Robert Jackson, former Associate Justice, 
Supreme Court of the United States 
 
 
This chapter analyzes the data and constitutional concerns identified by those in 
the literature review’s last camp who oppose SOCMINT. The opposition to the 
SOCMINT initiative insists that the endeavor creates a host of ancillary problems related 
to data management. Aside from collection and analysis challenges inherent in 
SOCMINT, the opponents predict additional data-related obstacles. They raise concerns 
over data retention, sharing, and security. A successful SOCMINT capability must 
adequately address data management problems. Failing to dispel these data concerns 
weakens the argument that SOCMINT enhances USCIS’ mission. The critics also raise 
concerns that the SOCMINT capability is incompatible with constitutional protections. 
Separate from the collection and analysis challenges characteristic of SOCMINT, those 
opposing SOCMINT warn of constitutional infringements. They cite SOCMINT’s 
adverse effect on privacy, speech, and discrimination. A viable SOCMINT program must 
not involve practices that unduly infringe on constitutional protections. Unless mitigated, 
these alleged constitutional incompatibilities are in tension with USCIS managing a 
viable SOCMINT capability.  
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A. DATA CONCERNS 
The critics’ arguments that the SOCMINT initiative creates a host of ancillary 
problems related to data management—data retention and data sharing, which can lead to 
subsequent misinterpretation, and data hacking risk—are unpersuasive. Sharing protocols 
and policies disprove the critics’ assertions about data concerns. USCIS adequately 
addresses the potential data management problems. The critics’ arguments relating to 
data obstacles are unpersuasive.  
1. Data Retention 
The critics opine that data retention related to SOCMINT creates perils. These 
dangers serve as additional grounds to oppose SOCMINT. A sensible SOCMINT 
program’s data retention policies should be grounded in rational principles. The merit of 
this claim about data retention would strengthen the critics’ position on data concerns.  
Patel et al.’s argument that retaining social media data for long periods of time 
increases the risk for misinterpretation is not persuasive.384 The authors opine, “A social 
media post from 2007 may take on a whole new meaning by 2022, and even more so 
decades later.”385 Retention has multiple benefits, and safeguards exist to mitigate the 
risk of misinterpretation at a later time. First, retention of FDNS data “provides access to 
information that can be critical to research related to suspected or confirmed fraud, 
criminal activity, egregious public safety, or national security concerns for applicants/
petitioners who may still be receiving immigration benefits.”386 Second, “should the 
individual apply for another benefit, retention of the information can eliminate the need 
for research on concerns that were previously addressed.”387 Third, retention also 
ensures “that cases that were reviewed and determined to have no nexus to fraud, 
criminal activity, egregious public safety, or national security concerns are not opened 
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again because old information is recycled.”388 In the case of temporal misinterpretations, 
the previously identified safeguards—data accuracy verification procedures, the 
opportunity to explain or refute, and sound evidentiary standards—offer protection.389 
Retention provides advantages to both immigration benefit seekers and the agency. 
Quentin et al. argue ensuring access is imperative in the law enforcement setting because 
data retention time can span decades.390 Sensible protections mitigate concerns over 
social media information susceptibility to misinterpretation. Balancing the retention 
benefits and acknowledging the safeguards against misinterpretation reduces the merit of 
the authors’ argument.  
EPIC’s allegation that the inclusion of social media data in immigrants’ official 
files “threatens First Amendment rights, risks abuse, and would disproportionately impact 
minority groups” fails to convince.391 The inclusion of social media data in immigrants’ 
official files actually benefits both the immigrants and agency. It provides the benefits 
previously discussed—access to critical research data, elimination of duplicate research, 
and the avoidance of redundant investigations.392 In addition, including social media data 
in immigrants’ official files supplements the official record regarding immigration benefit 
decisions. This evidence would be invaluable to immigrants who sought adjudicative 
review of any alleged impropriety involving First Amendment rights, abuse, or disparate 
minority treatment. Inclusion also benefits the agency, and actually protects against the 
potential harms of which EPIC warns. In light of the advantages to both immigrants and 
the agency, EPIC’s claim is shortsighted.  
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2. Data Sharing 
Concerns over SOCMINT data sharing further fuel the critics’ objection. Those 
opposing SOCMINT fear that DHS’ data practices further pervert SOCMINT’s viability. 
The protocols for the sharing of SOCMINT data should comport with policy and law, and 
mitigate the potential for misinterpretation by secondary, downstream users. If the critics’ 
fears prove reasonable, their data sharing concerns would be persuasive objections to 
SOCMINT.  
Patel et al.’s allegation, “DHS programs generally have low standards for sharing 
highly personal information, such as that found on social media” is questionable.393 
USCIS SOCMINT only involves open-source information that exists in the public 
domain. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy based on the third-party doctrine, 
which establishes that when “an individual invests a third party with information, and 
voluntarily agrees to share information with a recipient, the individual loses any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.”394 Therefore, the characterization 
of what exists in the public fora as “highly personal information” is a contradiction. 
Nevertheless, USCIS sharing protocols are stringent. For example, USCIS may only 
share publicly available information from social media websites:  
with federal, state, tribal, local, international, or foreign law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies, in response to an RFI [Request for Information] 
in support of criminal and administrative investigations and background 
checks involving immigrant benefit fraud, criminal activity, public safety, 
and national security concerns.395  
Sharing across LEA partners is considered essential to protecting the nation.396 As Wells 
notes though, law enforcement practitioners adhere to stricter standards than private 
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sector companies.397 USCIS takes open-source social media information and actually 
imposes a “higher” standard for sharing than the originating user. DHS secures the social 
media content behind the DHS firewall and only shares it with trusted LEA partners for 
official security matters. In contrast, the originating users indiscriminately release what is 
posted to anyone with an internet connection. Patel et al.’s claim regarding DHS’ low 
standards for sharing highly personal information does not pass scrutiny.  
Patel et al.’s contention, “[s]ocial media information collected for one purpose is 
used by DHS in a range of other contexts, increasing the likelihood of misinterpretation” 
is inaccurate.398 Documentation on USCIS’ use and safeguards of social media data 
contradicts the authors’ assertions about misinterpretation. FDNS uses collected social 
media for only one context—official matters relating to security, as explained earlier.399 
The retained FDNS-DS information “may be used to demonstrate an assessment was 
conducted so that additional resources do not have [to] be used for a second review.”400 
As a safeguard, “FDNS reconciles data to ensure that the data transferred from FDNS-DS 
to other systems is transferred accurately and completely to mitigate risk that the data 
may be taken out of context.”401 FDNS does not use social media data in the multi-
context manner the authors’ allege. Based on the actual single-purpose FDNS use of 
social media data and the deployed safeguards, Patel et al.’s misinterpretation argument is 
erroneous.  
3. Data Hacking Risk 
The critics raise the issue that data collected by a SOCMINT program is at risk of 
hacking. They believe collecting data during SOCMINT operations creates an additional 
threat to manage, keeping the data secure. The protocols for managing data derived from 
SOCMINT should address any potential for harm from misappropriation. If the fears 
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about hacking SOCMINT data are rational, this assertion helps justify the critics’ 
concerns about data.  
The argument, “[g]iven incidents like the breach of the Office of Personnel 
Management, travelers to the U.S. would have significant reason to be concerned” made 
by Inserra is irrelevant.402 The author bases this argument on the idea, “Social media 
passwords would be a target for hacktivists, criminals, and nation-state actors.”403 
Current USCIS policy and practice negates the concern that underpins this argument. 
Despite an official’s discussion of acquiring users’ social media account passwords, 
USCIS does not have or seek users’ passwords.404 USCIS only collects and uses publicly 
available information on social media websites.405 Travelers to the United States have no 
basis for concern that their passwords will be hacked while under USCIS control because 
the agency does not know or store users’ passwords. Inserra’s claim regarding the 
potential for hacking of users’ passwords is moot because USCIS does not know or 
possess applicants/petitioners’ social media account passwords.  
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
The critics’ allegations that SOCMINT is incompatible with constitutional 
protections—privacy, free speech, and against discrimination—are unconvincing. 
USCIS’ SOCMINT does not have the alleged adverse effects. The nature of the data 
involved, USCIS’ existing non-SOCMINT data collection activities, principles of 
consent, USCIS training, policy, and safeguards, and USCIS’ rationale for target 
selection disprove the critics’ allegations. USCIS’ SOCMINT initiative is not in tension 
with the Constitution.  
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1. Privacy 
The critics contend that SOCMINT is unacceptably intrusive. They frame this 
intrusion as an unavoidable consequence of SOCMINT. A responsible SOCMINT 
initiative must not unduly burden privacy expectations. The veracity of the intrusiveness 
claim would bolster the critics’ constitutional incompatibility argument.  
Patel et al.’s argument that collecting data, especially social media data, “intrudes 
on people’s privacy by allowing [the] government to know the details of their personal 
lives” is unpersuasive.406 The nature of the social media data collected, privacy rules, 
and the information collected from non-social media data collection efforts undermine 
this argument. First, USCIS SOCMINT only involves open-source information in the 
public domain, which, as noted previously, has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
based on the third-party doctrine.407 Second, USCIS may only access publicly available 
information, which respects users’ social media privacy settings.408 Third, USCIS’ 
application processes, unrelated to SOCMINT data collection, already include, but are 
not limited to, collection of the following types of data, some of which are very personal 
in nature:  
• legal name, aliases, date of birth, place of birth, gender, address, phone 
number, and e-mail address; 
• immigration history (applicant, spouse, and parents); 
• marital history (applicant and spouse); 
• details about victimization (human trafficking and criminal); 
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• details about political persecution basis (beliefs, religion, sexual 
orientation, etc.); 
• mental competence; 
• employment, education, and travel history; 
• details on others (current and former spouses, children, and parents); 
• ethnicity and race; 
• physical details (fingerprints, height, weight, eye, and hair); 
• memberships (organizations, associations, funds, foundations, parties, 
clubs, societies, etc.); 
• prior immigration encounters; 
• criminal history on acts and violations (applicant, spouse, and parents); 
• intended future criminal acts (illegal gambling, prostitution, bootlegging, 
child porn, etc.); 
• security-related intentions (sabotage, exporting sensitive info, 
overthrowing government, adverse foreign policy consequences, etc.); 
• military training; 
• communist, Nazi party, and terrorist organization affiliations; 
• public assistance benefits received; 
• polygamy; 
• medical conditions, diseases, and disabilities; 
• taxes, assets, debts, and banking statements; 
• divorce decrees; 
93 
• civics knowledge and English aptitude; 
• moral character; 
• extent of alcohol consumption; 
• child support obligations; 
• honesty in immigration and public assistance benefit matters; 
• constitutional support; 
• willingness to take oath of allegiance and take up arms; 
• photographs; etc.409 
In addition to the aforementioned items that are unrelated to SOCMINT data collection, 
FDNS officers may use commercial databases and public records, site visits, and 
administrative subpoenas to find further information.410 Commercial databases and 
public records are rich sources of personal information. Residential site visits provide 
details of immigrants’ personal lives, e.g., observation of photographs on living room 
walls, contents of bedroom closets and drawers, and bathroom vanities, etc. Subpoenas 
are an effective means for gathering details of immigrants’ personal lives.  
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USCIS application instructions disclose the background and security checks 
requirement to which an individual must submit.411 For example, the applicant’s 
declaration section on a typical form states:  
I authorize release of any information from any and all of my records that 
USCIS may need to determine my eligibility for the immigration benefit 
that I seek…I furthermore authorize the release of information contained 
in this application, in supporting documents, and in my USCIS record, to 
other entities and persons where necessary for the administration and 
enforcement of U.S. immigration law.412  
The applicant’s authorizations of release to USCIS and by USCIS function as consent. 
Arguably, social media content falls within the broad meaning of “any information from 
any and all of my records that USCIS may need.”413  
Patel et al., ACLU, and EPIC’s contention that vetting programs “sweep up 
information about American friends, family members, and business associates, either 
deliberately or as a consequence of their broad scope” and impact millions of people 
living in the United States, including U.S. citizens, is misleading.414 As noted, USCIS 
policy delineates that IOs may only access publicly available information, which respects 
users’ social media privacy settings.415 Therefore, any “sweep up” occurs based on the 
platform consent of the user, which makes raising this objection outlandish. According to 
Apple’s Chief Executive Officer Tim Cook, “When an online service is free, you’re not 
the customer—you’re the product.”416 Facebook ranks as one of the most valuable 
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businesses in the world.417 Morrissey says, “Where, we might ask, is that value 
derived?”418 The answer is from consenting users. Facebook monetizes users by selling 
ads based on what it knows about its users.419 In addition, users’ data is available to third 
parties.420 The social media business model is based on the exploitation and 
commercialization of personal data.421 Gilbert contends, “Facebook is ‘free,’ but you pay 
with your personal information.”422 He explains, “In exchange for accessing the social 
network, messaging, and the many other free services Facebook offers, users give up 
their personal information.”423  
Morrissey argues, “This is how Cambridge Analytica leveraged 272,000 app users 
into an entrée to access the personal data of 50 million of their friends.”424 He questions, 
“But should anyone really be surprised that Facebook allowed access to the personal data 
of 50 million people to outside firms?”425 For Morrissey, the answer is no because 
“[a]fter all, Facebook has been selling such access to advertisers for many years—and no 
one forces users to provide the data in the first place.”426 Morrissey warns, “If you don’t 
want to be the product, don’t sign up in the first place, or short of that, don’t load a bunch 
of personal data in the expectations that it will be kept private.”427 USCIS only collects 
and uses publicly available information on social media websites—data that the users 
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consented to allowing USCIS and anyone else to access.428 Consequently, Patel et al., 
ACLU, and EPIC’s argument objecting to vetting programs and the privacy of this data 
does not withstand scrutiny.  
2. Free Speech 
The critics theorize that SOCMINT will have adverse implications on free speech. 
They foresee SOCMINT creating far-reaching, undesirable effects beyond the subjects of 
inquiry. A viable SOCMINT capability should be structured to create public confidence 
that freedom of speech is not endangered. Unless mitigated, this contention supports the 
critics’ concerns about SOCMINT chilling speech.  
EPIC, ACLU, and Patel et al.’s contention that SOCMINT will chill free speech 
because foreign visitors, immigrants, and their family members and friends will self-
censor online is misleading.429 Collectively, the critics have presented a 
mischaracterization of the SOCMINT initiative that USCIS has deployed. Had their 
allegations in the previous chapters and sections concerning problems, safety, efficacy, 
and data been true, then arguably, people might have reason to consider self-censoring 
when posting on social media. However, as discussed earlier, these claims are false. In 
addition, USCIS honors First Amendment freedoms. The former USCIS director was 
emphatic with his directive that: 
[E]mployees will limit collection of information related to First 
Amendment protected activities that have taken place in the United States 
or related to activities undertaken by U.S. Citizens abroad to information 
that is reasonably related to adjudicative, investigative, or incident 
responses matters.430  
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In support of this mandate, officers conducting social media checks are required 
to “[c]omplete the USCIS Privacy Requirements for Operational Use of Social Media 
training program and acknowledge they have read and understand the Component Rules 
of Behavior, on an annual basis.”431 Officers must also “Complete all training for the 
operational use of social media offered by FDNS and acknowledge that they have read 
and understand the Rules of Behavior for that operational use of social media.”432 In 
addition, officers must conduct social media research pursuant to the Social Media 
Operational Use Template approved by the DHS Office of Privacy.433 Nevertheless, the 
critics raise an important issue. As with any human-based system, efforts at the front end 
may not guarantee employee conduct during execution. Policies, procedures, and training 
are not 100 percent effective, despite best intentions. However, separate investigation, 
adjudication, and appeal personnel provide multiple, layered opportunities for oversight 
and course correction, if necessary. USCIS has established policy, procedures, and 
training in an effort to respect the exercise of freedom of speech consistent with the 
Constitution and thereby mitigate the risk of SOCMINT chilling free speech.  
3. Discrimination 
SOCMINT, in the eyes of the opposition, exacerbates exiting concerns over 
discrimination. The opponents equate SOCMINT to efforts akin to the Muslim travel ban. 
An ethical SOCMINT capability should identify and address potential threats on their 
merits and not discriminate based on religion or ethnicity. If incontrovertible, the 
opposition’s argument about discrimination creates a compelling justification for 
scrapping SOCMINT.  
Handeyside and Cagle’s contention that DHS’ social media screening “lacks 
protections against discrimination and profiling” and has a risk of abuse is debatable.434 
The authors base their claim on limited information from redacted USCIS SOCMINT 
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documentation on research and development findings. Handeyside and Cagle opine that 
“internal reviews obtained through FOIA from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services show that its social media screening efforts lacked protections against 
discrimination and profiling.”435 In support of this allegation, Handeyside and Cagle cite 
Sternstein. According to Sternstein, “Civil rights groups who reviewed the USCIS 
[FOIA] documents say that their wording suggests the social media program is targeting 
foreigners from predominantly Muslim nations.”436 The absence of policy discussions 
concerning “discrimination and profiling” in a research and development report does not 
prove, however, that the appropriate protections do not exist. The protections are a matter 
more appropriately memorialized in policy documents and standard operating procedures, 
not research and development findings involving a social media tool assessment. The 
authors thus offer unconvincing evidence to support their claim about the risk of abuse.  
Patel et al.’s question on whether SOCMINT “disproportionately targets Muslims 
and those from Muslim-majority countries” is shortsighted.437 The populations chosen 
for SOCMINT research and development testing are not dispositive on what populations 
will be screened when a fully deployed operational capability is launched. Government, 
like industry, routinely tests new initiatives on subsets of populations.438 USCIS made it 
clear that its efforts were not disproportionately focused. For example, internal reports 
indicate, “USCIS also intends to pilot the expansion of the use of social media to other 
cases/benefit request types.”439 USCIS made good on that promise.  
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DHS began social media research and development projects in 2015.440 The 
Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017 report details the number of 
admissions of refugees by country for fiscal year 2015.441 Analysis of “TABLE III 
Refugee Arrivals By Country of Origin Fiscal Year 2015” indicates that 91.4 percent of 
arriving refugees come from a mere 10 of the 59 countries that involve refugee 
admission: Burma, Iraq, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Bhutan, Iran, former 
Soviet Union, Syria, Eritrea, and Sudan.442 Five of these countries are alleged “Muslim-
ban” countries: Iraq, Somalia, Iran, Syria, and Sudan. The Department of State estimates 
that 50 percent of the Eritrea population is Sunni Muslim.443 Therefore, a majority of the 
top 10 refugee countries are Muslim. Creating a new initiative requires a starting point. 
Arguably, it makes sense to research and develop a SOCMINT capability that is sensitive 
to the cultural, linguistic, etc., nuances of a group that represents the majority of the total 
refugee population that needs to be vetted. However, USCIS did not focus its SOCMINT 
efforts exclusively on refugees.  
In 2016, DHS conducted a number of research and development projects to 
review “social media information across a number of high priority application 
populations, including refugees and [emphasis added] Visa Waiver Program 
travelers.”444 The 38 Visa Waiver Program countries are not generally considered 
Muslim countries.445 USCIS commenced its SOCMINT testing with a population choice 
based on refugee statistics and then expanded it to a population that includes 38 non-
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Muslim countries, which dispels any myths concerning the disproportionate targeting of 
Muslims.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The critics’ data management issues argument is unconvincing. Data retention 
benefits both the agency and those seeking immigration benefits. DHS has instituted 
strict data sharing protocols, and has implemented safeguards to mitigate the critics’ 
misinterpretation concerns. The retention of social media data presents no more hacking 
risk than other government data holdings. Consent, the nature of the social media data 
collected, privacy rules, and other non-social media data collected by DHS persuade 
against the critics’ privacy contentions. SOCMINT is not in conflict with constitutional 
protections. The DHS’ deployment of SOCMINT across a broad group of vetting 
populations forecloses accusations about discrimination against certain groups. DHS has 
policy, procedures, and training in place to honor freedom of speech. However, humans 
are not infallible. Therefore, USCIS must maintain strong, layered oversight mechanisms 
to mitigate the critics’ legitimate concerns about chilling speech. In sum, the merits of the 
critics’ claims about data and constitutional concerns fail to convince. The next chapter 
presents recommendations and conclusions based on the propositions for SOCMINT and 
the analysis of objections and rebuttals contained in this chapter and in the preceding two 
chapters.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Homegrown violent extremism abetted by the reach and power of 
contemporary social media has completely changed national security 
today.  




Balancing the security needs of the U.S. with the efforts to welcome 
immigrants must be a coordinated effort. The weight of this charge does 
not rest solely on the shoulders of the immigration services of the country, 
it requires input and cooperation from several agencies and departments 
within the government as well as the support of Congress and the 
American People.  
 —Julie Farnam, author, 
U.S. Immigration Laws under the Threat of Terrorism 
 
 
Terrorists use the internet to disseminate propaganda, solicit new members, 
communicate, gather intelligence, seek money, and inspire and plan attacks.446 Their use 
provides an opportunity for DHS to leverage SOCMINT to secure the homeland. This 
thesis explored the necessity and efficacy of open-source SOCMINT in identifying 
potential fraud, public safety, and/or national security concerns from immigrants seeking 
immigration benefits from USCIS. This thesis examined qualitative data of the issue 
rhetoric—the debate and discussion—between the critics and supporters of implementing 
SOCMINT. In addition, quantitative data from the PIRUS dataset provided insight into 
the viability of using SOCMINT to identify threats among immigration benefit seekers.  
A. SUMMARY 
USCIS “administers the nation’s lawful immigration system, safeguarding its 
integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration 
benefits while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring our 
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values.”447 USCIS began conducting SOCMINT research and development projects to 
test the automation of “bulk screening of social media information” supplemented with 
human analyst “review across a number of high-priority populations.”448 The OIG 
investigated and reported on DHS’ efforts as if they were pilots versus research and 
development projects.449 Based in part on the OIG findings and FOIA-released 
documents, the skeptics of SOCMINT argue against its use. The skeptics contend that the 
number of social media platforms, posts, and foreign languages used, context 
ambiguities, constitutional implications, data management issues, and targets’ evasion 
efforts make the DHS open-source SOCMINT capability unviable.450  
1. Propositions for SOCMINT 
As discussed in Chapter II, the PIRUS dataset reveals that approximately 10 
percent of individuals who have radicalized have had contact with the lawful immigration 
system. The internet and social media played a significant role for the majority of those 
who radicalized. The internet played a role in terrorist plots for radicalized immigrants 
who use social media. For example, almost 87 percent used the internet for logistics or 
communication in preparation of a violent plot. One-third of these subjects were doers 
versus talkers in that they acted on carrying out their terrorist plots. Over 61 percent of 
the subjects used social media at least daily in a manner that related to radicalization and/
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or plot mobilization. Almost 10 percent directly communicated with members of an 
extremist group on social media to facilitate a domestic attack. Only 70 percent used 
operational security measures to hide or conceal preparation for the plot. These figures 
indicate an opportunity and need to use SOCMINT to identify fraud, public safety, and/or 
national security threats among immigration benefit seekers. The figures support Nissen’s 
argument that terrorists have weaponized social media.451 State, local, federal, and 
international LEAs are using social media, in turn, to identify potential terrorists. While 
critics have questioned the efficacy of using open-source SOCMINT to stop terrorism, 
the LEA proponents of SOCMINT have achieved successful results for years.  
2. SOCMINT Problematic Effort and Necessity Concerns 
Despite the evidence that deploying a SOCMINT capability will likely play a vital 
role in USCIS’ obligation to secure the homeland, the critics put forth a series of 
objections to SOCMINT. A broader, balanced analysis of the OIG report and FOIA-
released documents, however, undermines the allegation that efforts to deploy a 
SOCMINT capability to date have been fraught with problems. Nevertheless, the critics 
raise insightful concerns about the value of evaluating efforts and policy and procedure. 
USCIS’ deployed operational capability must continue to heed those concerns. Insights 
from the 9/11 Commission and other experts, a more fulsome reading of the OIG and 
FOIA-released documents, and the PIRUS dataset undermine the argument that the 
nation is safe enough without SOCMINT.  
3. SOCMINT Efficacy Concerns 
The critics also identify an assortment of issues that call into question the efficacy 
of SOCMINT including yield, scope, scale, language, context, encryption, and identity 
resolution challenges. A broader, balanced analysis of the OIG report and FOIA-released 
documents, though, refutes the claims about yield in identifying threats. Security experts’ 
opinions, LEAs’ use of and their successes with SOCMINT, and the PIRUS research 
provide evidence that SOCMINT can improve the nation’s security. The critics’ 
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automation argument about scope and scale is unpersuasive because USCIS is not relying 
on automated SOCMINT for the process of reviewing posts. Safeguards are in place to 
mitigate language and context misinterpretation and any potential derivative adverse 
outcomes. Nevertheless, the critics’ interpretation concerns demand USCIS’ continued 
vigilance because any human-based system is fallible. The PIRUS dataset contradicts the 
critics’ encryption claim for both internet users and social media users. The critics’ claim 
about identity resolution is therefore questionable.  
4. SOCMINT Data and Constitutional Concerns 
Those opposing the SOCMINT initiative insist that it creates a variety of ancillary 
problems related to data management: data retention, sharing, and security. Social media 
data retention has multiple benefits for immigrants and the agency, and safeguards exist 
to mitigate the risk of misinterpretation at a later time. The critics’ arguments about 
misinterpretation from data sharing are unpersuasive because there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in open-source social media data. Nonetheless, USCIS imposes 
strict sharing protocols, which are actually a “higher” standard for sharing than the 
originating user. The argument regarding the potential for hacking of users’ passwords is 
inapt because USCIS does not collect social media account passwords.  
The critics also argue that the SOCMINT capability is incompatible with 
constitutional protections. The nature of the social media data collected, privacy rules, 
and the information collected from non-social media data collection efforts undermine 
the argument about SOCMINT privacy intrusiveness. USCIS has implemented policy, 
procedures, and training in an effort to respect the exercise of freedom of speech 
consistent with the Constitution. USCIS’ efforts thereby mitigate against the risk of 
SOCMINT chilling free speech. USCIS nonetheless must maintain strong, layered 
oversight mechanisms to mitigate the critics’ legitimate concerns about chilling speech. 
USCIS’ SOCMINT vetting activity involving refugees and a population that includes 38 




Although the research in this thesis supports the continued deployment of 
SOCMINT to assist in achieving USCIS’ mission, the study experienced several 
limitations. The first limitation relates to bias potential. As the author is an FDNS officer, 
a SMD certified SOCMINT officer, and former member and lead on the SMTF, the 
potential for bias does exist. This thesis nonetheless attempts to remain analytically 
neutral and allow the propositions for and against SOCMINT to flourish based on their 
fact-based merit. A second limitation was the nature of the research and discussion. Much 
of DHS’ work in this sphere is classified as top secret and takes place in sensitive 
compartmented information facilities. However, the research and discussion in this thesis 
relies exclusively on publicly available information. This reliance was unavoidable 
because comprehensive threat and tradecraft disclosures might provide threat actors a 
blueprint for evasion. Other limitations were related to policy and technology.  
SOCMINT is a dynamic space in terms of how threat and technology affect 
policy. The research and conclusions of this thesis contemplate the current threat 
environment and technological capabilities as policy drivers. Technological advances 
impact wrongdoers’ opportunities to achieve their ends and the homeland security 
enterprise’s capability to thwart the wrongdoers’ efforts. A contemporary assessment of 
SOCMINT therefore must embrace these policy drivers.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Potentially allowing threats to go undetected ignores USCIS mission mandates. 
Ignoring reasonable lines of investigative inquiry violates public trust.452 Hypothetically, 
if it became known that USCIS failed to identify discoverable threats, USCIS would 
likely face scrutiny from the public and internal stakeholders, such as Congress, the OIG, 
the GAO, etc. Consequently, there are a number of recommendations that flow from the 
research and analysis contained in this thesis.  
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• USCIS should continue to use open-source SOCMINT to identify fraud, 
public safety, and/or national security threats. Agile leveraging of 
authorities and technology to meet threat identification needs is critical. It 
is important to look broadly beyond DHS for expertise and best practices 
on SOCMINT among law enforcement agency partners’ initiatives, e.g., 
Social Media the Internet and Law Enforcement conferences, Five Eyes 
members, and ROSM.453  
Wells warns of the adverse effect on the public perceptions of SOCMINT 
initiatives when the subjective narratives are not addressed.454 Ignoring the opposing 
narratives and failing to engage the grievances and misconceptions fosters a lack of 
public clarity.455  
• DHS should use care in appropriately designating efforts as pilots or 
research and development projects and ensure a unified understanding, 
management, and messaging across DHS components. DHS components 
should resist merely concurring with OIG findings to silence concerns 
versus defending actions on their merits. Senior DHS leadership should 
publicly defend ill-informed narratives from critic and media echo 
chambers that confound fact-based public interpretation of DHS 
initiatives.  
After conducting SOCMINT research and development projects using DARPA 
and commercial tools, DHS identified technical challenges that may continue to serve as 
obstacles in deploying the most robust SOCMINT capability. Conversely, the UK 
pursued a collaborative approach to tool development with TENSOR and DANTE. The 
UK partnered with different countries, different LEAs, academia, and industry forming 
consortiums and using advisory boards. The TENSOR and DANTE projects purport to 
                                               
453 Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and 
Department of Justice, Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information, 8.  
454 Wells, “Taking Stock of Subjective Narratives,” 57.  
455 Wells, 58–63.  
107 
have addressed the identical technical and privacy challenges that DHS’ efforts 
encountered.  
Organizationally, a successful SOCMINT capability requires a clear vision, unity 
of effort, and momentum. Each of these requirements flourishes under an unambiguous 
articulation and execution of commander’s intent. Centralization, in the form of a COE or 
hub, of the SOCMINT efforts has desirable benefits. Best practices, lessons learned, and 
intelligence are easily shared. DHS component members who would comprise the COE 
could avoid duplicate development and maintenance costs, innovation failures, etc. This 
avoidance is particularly critical in technology endeavors where change and updates are 
exponentially recurring. Participants in the UK’s OSINT Hub tout the benefits of yielding 
state-of-the-art tools, the generation and access to actionable intelligence, coordination, 
cost avoidance, innovation, among other things—all resulting in better decision making 
in the fight against terrorism.  
• DHS should consider supplementing the open solicitation and commercial 
tool approach for SOCMINT tool development in favor of a model more 
aligned with the UK’s DANTE and TENSOR project approaches.456  
• DHS should research the viability of creating a centralized COE for DHS’ 
SOCMINT capability modeled on the UK’s CENTRIC OSINT Hub.457  
SOCMINT policies should provide optimal threat detection and actionable 
intelligence useful to decision makers.458 However, this outcome requires sensibly 
constructing efforts designed to achieve a balance between security and liberty by 
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listening to those who have an interest in the outcome.459 This stakeholder consideration 
helps foster enhanced public trust.460  
• USCIS should ensure data and constitutional protections are robust. 
Policies, procedures, and training are in place to prevent problems. 
However, as with any human-based system, efforts at the front end may 
not guarantee employee conduct during execution. Policies, procedures, 
and training are not 100 percent effective, despite best intentions. 
Consequently, USCIS must also remain equally vigilant in its oversight 
efforts to protect the principles of our homeland.  
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
In light of the results of this study, several recommendations for future research 
can be proffered. First, this thesis focused on DHS, specifically USCIS, SOCMINT 
efforts. However, the war on terrorism is truly global and affects many agencies and 
countries. Partnering and information sharing are key tenets of success in the fight against 
terrorism. Future studies could explore in detail how other LEAs, foreign and domestic, 
specifically deploy tradecraft to conduct SOCMINT programs successfully. Such an 
effort would require a thesis audience restricted to law enforcement personnel, but might 
enhance USCIS success with SOCMINT.  
Second, this study only considered evasion from detection by use of operational 
security, such as encryption. However, the social media platform operators’ takedowns 
can also affect detection, e.g., when platforms remove terrorism content and suspend 
accounts. Future studies could explore how platform operators make those takedown 
decisions, the takedowns’ effect on LEAs’ monitoring of terrorist networks, the 
takedowns’ effect on LEAs’ undercover operations, and the potential for private and 
public sector collaboration to enhance safety.  
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Third, this study did not take a deep dive into the SOCMINT tool technology. As 
technology changes, new or improved tool capabilities for enhanced detection may 
appear. Future studies could assess the emerging state of the art of natural language 
processing, sentiment analysis, deep neural networks, image classifiers, etc. This research 
may assist DHS in ensuring it is consistently leveraging the best in class as technology 
changes.  
Fourth, this study considers only USCIS’ research and development efforts for 
tool development and capability deployment. Other agencies and countries have taken 
different approaches to SOCMINT tool development and organizational capability 
deployment. As alluded to in the aforementioned recommendations, future studies could 
comparatively explore the UK’s TENSOR and DANTE initiatives and OSINT Hub 
architecture. This research may assist DHS in ensuring it is using optimal SOCMINT 
tools and operating its SOCMINT capability in an optimal organizational structure.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Social media has changed the world, in part by presenting new threat and 
detection opportunities for terrorism. Open-source SOCMINT offers USCIS a 
contribution in assisting with its homeland security mission. Despite the poor assessment 
narratives flourishing in the critics’ echo chamber, SOCMINT could be a successful and 
effective means to identity threats among immigration benefit seekers as long as USCIS 
adheres to its dual-obligation to use SOCMINT to secure the homeland while being 
mindful of the aforementioned data and constitutional concerns. The benefits of 
SOCMINT, overall, outweigh the potential for harm.  
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APPENDIX. PROFILES OF INDIVIDUAL RADICALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 Profiles of individual radicalization in the United States, Keshif data visualization tool471  
                                               
471 Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the 
United States (PIRUS).”  
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